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Abstract 
The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is consistently implicated in the network 
supporting autobiographical memory and episodic simulation, but its functional 
contribution to these cognitive abilities remains unclear. Given its involvement in 
value processing in decision-making processes, mPFC might be important in 
contributing in a similar way during memory and imagery. Two fMRI 
experiments were carried out in order to examine if the mPFC plays a role in 
representing the subjective value of elements in autobiographical memory and, 
separately, in mental imagery. In Experiment 1, a paradigm was designed in 
which participants imagined scenarios involving details about spatial context, a 
physiological state of need (e.g. thirst), and two items which could be congruent 
(e.g. drink) or incongruent (e.g. food) with the imagined state. Results confirmed 
that the imagined-value paradigm is able to manipulate the participants’ 
subjective values of imagined items. Therefore, the same paradigm was 
performed while the participants were in the scanner in Experiment 2. The fMRI 
signal in the mPFC reflected the modulation of an item’s subjective value by the 
imagined physiological state, suggesting that the mPFC selectively tracks 
subjective value during mental imagery. In Experiment 3, the participants 
recalled autobiographical episodes and items (liked and disliked items) from 
each episode in the scanner. The blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal 
in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was parametrically modulated by 
the affective values of the items in the participants’ memories when they were 
recalling and evaluating these items. An unrelated modulation by the 
participants’ familiarity with the items was also observed. During the retrieval of 
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an event, the BOLD signal in the same region was modulated by the personal 
significance and emotional intensity of the memory, which was correlated with 
the values of the items within them. These results support the idea that vmPFC 
processes self-relevant information and suggest that it is involved in 
representing the personal emotional values of the elements comprising 
autobiographical memories. In conclusion, the experiments in this thesis 
provided evidence to support the hypothesis that mPFC represents the 
subjective values of elements in our mental imagery and autobiographical 
memories.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction to Autobiographical Memory, Episodic 
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1.1. Autobiographical memory recall and episodic imagery 
Autobiographical memories are memories regarding events that have occurred 
in our real life (Conway, 1992; Conway & Pleydell-pearce, 2000). 
Autobiographical memories consists of both episodic memory and semantic 
memory (Levine et al., 2004). For example, to recall the experience of your first 
job interview is an autobiographical memory recall. You can not only recall the 
facts of this event but can also vividly re-experience most, if not all, of what 
happened within that event. You might be able to recall the setting of the waiting 
room, as well as the feelings of nervousness and anxiety while waiting for the 
interview. You might recall which pair of shoes you wore and also re-experience 
the pain on your heels from the shoe rubbing. Autobiographical memories, 
especially those significant ones, play a major role in defining and shaping who 
we are. 
Episodic imagery, or mental imagery, is the ability to mentally construct a 
situation or scenario which differs from the current one. The content of mental 
imagery is constructed from multimodal such as visual, auditory, odour, haptics, 
emotions and so on. For example, to imagine oneself finally arrive the top of 
Mount Everest on a sunny day after 40-days of climbing. The imagined scene 
may involve the great scenery view from Mount Everest, physical tiredness and 
muscle soreness from climbing, happiness, and excitement because of the 
accomplishment. 
Memory retrieval is a reconstructive process (Bartlett, 1932), and so is 
autobiographical memory recall. In addition to involving the complex details of 
the scene from an event, the concept of self and self-relevant processes are 
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also thought to be incorporated in our autobiographical memories (e.g., Gilboa, 
2004; St. Jacques, 2012). Such self-relevant processes are often evident during 
episodic retrieval (e.g., Brian Levine, 2004), imagination or ‘episodic simulation’ 
(e.g., Benoit & Schacter, 2015; i.e. to mentally simulate oneself in a situation 
which is different from the current one, or to simulate an alternative situation to 
what really happened in the past, or to picture a circumstance in the future). To 
create such detailed and complex scenes in our mind, it is proposed that one 
must (1) construct pieces of information into a meaningful narrative (Schacter & 
Addis, 2007), (2) visualise or construct the complex scene (Bird & Burgess, 
2008; Byrne, Becker, & Burgess, 2007; Hassabis et al., 2009; Hassabis, 
Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Mullally & Maguire, 2014) and (3) project oneself 
into the scenario via mental time travel (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Tulving, 
2002). 
1.1.1. Neural mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval and 
episodic imagery 
Considering that there are many commonalities between autobiographical 
memory recall and episodic imagery, it is not surprising that patients with 
impaired memory also demonstrate difficulties during mental imagery (Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Bertossi, Aleo, Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016; 
Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, & Ciaramelli, 2016; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & 
Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Tulving, 1985). For example, 
when imagining novel experiences, patients with hippocampal lesions 
generated fewer details and less coherent contents than controls did (Hassabis, 
Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007). Patients with mPFC lesions had impairments in 
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both memory recall and future imagination (Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; Bertossi, 
Tesini, et al., 2016). 
Neuroimaging studies have also shown that autobiographical memory retrieval 
and episodic imagination recruit a similar brain network, or so called “core 
network” (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). The core network (see Figure 1) includes 
the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial cortex, posterior 
parietal cortices (PPC), and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (e.g., Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; for a review, 
see Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2009; for meta-analysis, see Benoit & 
Schacter, 2015). Given the broad range of regions identified by such studies, 
understanding how each of these areas function and interact with each other is 
critical to the field of memory. 
Among these brain regions, the medial temporal lobe has a well-known 
essential role in memory encoding and retrieval (reviewed in Eichenbaum, 
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007). In general, the hippocampus is critical to 
memory encoding, consolidation and recollection. The potential functional roles 
of the hippocampal, parahippocampal and retrosplenial and medial parietal 
cortices in generating visual imagery for spatial scenes have been proposed 
and simulated in some detail (e.g., Bird & Burgess, 2008; Byrne et al., 2007). 
Meanwhile, although there are still ongoing debates about the function of 
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in autobiographical memory retrieval, there are 
multiple theories regarding its potential function. For example, based on the 
classical accounts of PPC function in attention processing, one hypothesis 
suggests that the superior PPC mediates top-down attention when attention is 
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necessary for memory retrieval and the inferior PPC mediates bottom-up 
attention when attention is captured by memory contents (for reviews, see 
Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson, & Moscovitch, 2008; Ciaramelli, Grady, Levine, 
Ween, & Moscovitch, 2010; Yazar, Bergström, & Simons, 2012). An alternative 
hypothesis tries to address this issue from the perspective of memory dual-
process, i.e. familiarity- and recollection-related recognition judgment (e.g., 
Montaldi, Spencer, Roberts, & Mayes, 2006; Vilberg & Rugg, 2007). Some 
other researchers propose that the function of inferior parietal cortex is relevant 
to maintain or represent retrieved information, like a temporary information 
buffer (Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & Buckner, 2005). 
Which is similar to the working memory buffer proposed by Baddeley 
(Baddeley, 2000). 
Finally, although studies have consistently shown that both autobiographical 
memory recall and episodic imagery recruit the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), the functional role of mPFC in autobiographical memory recall and 
episodic imagery is not clear yet. Regarding the function of mPFC in 
autobiographical memory, there is not much relevant literature at the moment. 
In one study, Speer and colleagues (2014) found that activity of mPFC and 
striatum was enhanced by retrieval of positive emotional autobiographical 
memories. They, therefore, hypothesised that the involvement of mPFC in 
autobiographical memory retrieval is because these memories are valuable 
(see also D’Argembeau, 2013). In another study, Bonnici and Maguire (2012) 
demonstrated that vmPFC contains both recent (two weeks old) and remote (10 
years old) autobiographical memories. However, the remote memories are 
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more strongly represented in vmPFC and other neocortical regions. In short, 
there is little agreement on what role mPFC plays in mental imagery and 
autobiographical memory retrieval. 
The involve of mPFC beyond autobiographical memory retrieval. Memory 
encoding, confabulation, and fear extinction all recruit regions within mPFC 
(Milad et al., 2005; Milad & Quirk, 2002; Schnider, 2003; Simons & Spiers, 
2003). For instances, in a trait adjective judgement study, mPFC activity was 
found to be greater for subsequently remembered words than that for 
subsequently forgotten words and also greater for self-descriptive traits 
(Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004). Patients with mPFC 
lesions may manifest spontaneous confabulation (for a review, see Schnider, 
2003). These may provide insight into the role of mPFC in autobiographical 
memory retrieval and episodic imagery. 
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Figure 1. The core network 
Illustration of the core autobiographical memory network demonstrating the similarity in 
regions between (A) memory recall and (B) future simulation (taken from Buckner and 
Carrot, 2007) and (C) the overlap of activity between episodic memory recall, recalling 
a previously imagined fictitious scene, and imaging a novel fictitious scene. Regions in 
this core network, included hippocampi, parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial, posterior 
parietal cortices, middle temporal cortices, and medial prefrontal cortex (taken from 
Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007). 
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1.1.2. Hypotheses regarding the overlap of AM and mental imagery 
As mentioned above, mental imagery and autobiographical memory retrieval 
recruit similar brain regions, so-called the core network (Schacter et al., 2009). 
Several hypotheses which have been proposed aimed to explain why both of 
these two cognitive functions rely on the core network. In this section, I will 
briefly introduce three relevant hypotheses or theories, i.e., the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis, the scene construction theory, and self-
projection hypothesis. 
1.1.2.1. Scene construction theory 
According to scene construction theory, episodic memory recall, mental 
imagery, future simulation, and spatial navigation all require an ability to 
generate, maintain, and visualise a reasonable and spatially-coherent scene 
(Bird & Burgess, 2008; Hassabis et al., 2009; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 
2007; Mullally & Maguire, 2014). And hippocampus is the key region to 
construct these complex scenes (Maguire & Mullally, 2013). 
A former London taxi driver with bilateral hippocampal lesions became unable 
to navigate from one location to another efficiently after limbic encephalitis. This 
patient reported that he cannot picture the route beforehand during navigation 
and the authors believe this implies that hippocampus is critical to scene 
construction (Maguire, Nannery, & Spiers, 2006). Another evidence supporting 
scene construction theory is the phoneme of boundary extension. Boundary 
extension was described by Intraub and Richardson (1989, as cited in Mullally & 
Maguire, 2014) in healthy people. After viewing a picture of a scene, people 
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implicitly extend the boundary of the scene and representation of the scene 
contains more details than the actual picture. If the same picture is shown to 
people after a delay, they would believe the second picture is closer up than the 
first one. Boundary extension has only been observed when the picture 
contains background scene but not when the picture presents a background 
isolated object. Boundary extension requires intact scene construction (Mullally 
& Maguire, 2014). Patients with hippocampal damage showed smaller boundary 
extension effect than healthy controls (Chadwick, Mullally, & Maguire, 2013; 
Mullally, Intraub, & Maguire, 2012). These results hence support the scene 
construction theory.  
Also, the computational elements of ‘scene-construction’ are consistent with the 
neural firing patterns found in medial temporal and parietal regions (Burgess, 
Becker, King, & O’Keefe, 2001; Byrne et al., 2007). However, this theory 
focuses on hippocampal and posterior cortical areas and does not explain the 
involvement of prefrontal regions within the core network. 
1.1.2.2. Self-projection hypothesis 
The term ‘mental time travel’ refers to the ability to immerse oneself in scenarios 
which are different from the currently experiencing one- an ability which might 
be absent in most other animals (Tulving, 2002; although see Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1998; Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003). To vividly recall a past 
experience is hence a mental time travel to the past. The direction in which an 
individual engages in mental time travel is not simply by reminiscing on the past 
but by also visualising future events. According to Tulving (2002), humans are 
able to perform mental time travel because they have three critical abilities. 
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Humans have the sense of subjective time; they are able to differentiate when 
recalling the past, experiencing the physical world or simulating the future; and 
they have the sense of self. In other words, humans are able to project 
themselves into various time points, i.e., self-projection. 
Self-projection may not only contribute to mental time travel, but also to Theory 
of Mind and spatial navigation because these abilities all engage similar brain 
networks, or, the core network (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). In other words, 
humans are able to project themselves into other times, spaces, and agents 
(Okuda, 2007). According to the self-projection hypothesis, the MTL, prefrontal 
and parietal areas of the core network collaborate together to make self-
projection possible (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). However, 
some have suggested that such self-projection is mainly supported by the 
frontal and parietal areas of the core network, without the MTL (e.g., Nyberg, 
Kim, Habib, Levine, & Tulving, 2010). Both views therefore agree that the 
prefrontal region of the core network is essential to self-projection. 
In a recent study, Bertossi et al. (2016) demonstrated that patients with 
ventromedial Prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) lesions have difficulty in recalling 
memories and imagining future events. Compared to healthy controls, patients 
in Bertossi et al. (2016) created fewer and less vivid details when imagining 
future scenarios. The authors suggested that this confirms the involvement of 
vmPFC in constructive processes. Interestingly, these patients did not only 
demonstrate deficits in imagining self-related scenarios but also showed deficits 
when imagining scenarios relating to others (in this case, others were family 
members or the president of the Italian Republic). This implies that the self-
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projection hypothesis itself is not enough to explain the function of mPFC 
because to picture a future event happening to a close other or a distant other 
do not involve self-projection but mPFC patients still have deficits in these 
domains. 
1.1.2.3. Constructive episodic simulation hypothesis 
According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, the reason why 
episodic counterfactual thinking or episodic mental imagery recruit similar brain 
networks as autobiographical memory recall does is because mental imagery 
contains two critical parts: (1) to retrieve or access to memory contents, and (2) 
to integrate the retrieved information into a meaningful story/narrative (Schacter 
et al., 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007). 
Memory retrieval is a reconstructive process (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Ranganath, 
2010; Schacter, Kenneth, & Koutstaal, 1998; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). 
When encoding, we do not memorise information bit by bit; when recalling, we 
do not simply replay the encoded contents. Otherwise, we would not be able to 
observe the phenomena of false recognition or memory confabulation (e.g., 
Schacter et al., 1998). 
To recall an episode, people need to access to memory, to pick up relevant 
details and to assemble all the elements into a meaningful story. Schacter and 
Addis (2007) argue that the episodic memory system makes these steps 
possible because it is highly adaptive. It is critical for an individual to mentally 
simulate plausible situations so he/she is able to prepare or plan ahead before 
the events happen in the real world. The process of episodic memory recall is 
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very similar to that in episodic simulation and this similarity caused the 
overlapping of neural networks in episodic memory retrieval and mental imagery 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007). 
Although episodic simulation and episodic memory retrieval recruit similar brain 
network, there are also observable differences in brain networks. The 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis also focuses on the subtle 
differences between simulation and memory recall (Schacter et al., 2012) and it 
suggests that there are two distinct subsystems within the core network (Addis, 
Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009)- one for imagining and the other one for 
remembering. The one for imagining includes anterior hippocampus, medial 
prefrontal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus while the one for autobiographical 
memory recall includes hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, and visual 
cortex. 
In general, neuroimaging studies have shown that, several regions show 
greater activity during episodic simulation than during episodic recall (for a 
meta-analysis, see Benoit & Schacter, 2015), including mPFC, dlPFC, posterior 
cingulate gyrus, posterior inferior parietal lobe, and MTL (Figure 2). The 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis explained these differences in two 
ways. First, episodic simulation may demand higher cognitive control than 
episodic memory recall does. Unlike the contents of episodic memory, the 
contents of episodic simulation have not yet happened hence there is usually 
more than one way to develop the imagined contents. To carefully select 
theoretically plausible contents for imagined scenarios and to exclude unwanted 
outputs may require higher cognitive control demands. This could be able to 
24 
 
explain why episodic simulation activates dlPFC to a greater degree than 
episodic memory recall. Second, in order to acquire adequate information to 
complete a plausibly imagined scenario, it is necessary to retrieve multiple 
memories. This could be the reason why the MTL activity is higher in episodic 
simulation than episodic memory recall. 
 
Figure 2. EPISODIC SIMULATION VS. MEMORY RECALL 
Brain regions showing greater activity during episodic simulation versus memory recall 
(warm colours), and vice versa (cool colours) (figure taken from Schacter et al., 2012). 
1.1.2.4. Summary 
In this section, three theories have been introduced and briefly discussed. All 
these three hypotheses attempt to explain why autobiographical memory and 
episodic imagery recruit similar neural networks. They all assume that some 
similar components are included in both cognitive processes and the similarities 
contribute to the overlapping of neural networks recruitment. Scene construction 
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theory suggests that both autobiographical memory recall and episodic imagery 
involve the process of generating and visualising complex spatial scenes, while 
the self-projection hypothesis suggests that to project oneself into certain time-
points or locations is the common component between autobiographical 
memory recall and episodic imagery. Finally, constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis focuses on the function of MTL and suggests that both cognitive 
processes require us to recall a memory and reconstruct it into a coherent story. 
These hypotheses may not be mutually exclusive. Instead, they focus on 
different perspectives and all these perspectives are logically reasonable. For 
example, it seems plausible that, in line with a constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis, both memory retrieval and episodic simulation are constructive 
processes in nature. To generate a plausible imagined scenario, one has to 
retrieve information from multiple stored memories and combine all the 
information together and turn it into a complete and comprehensive scene. 
However, this process also involves self-concept representation or self-related 
processing because ‘self’ is a fundamental component of autobiographical 
memory and episodic imagining. 
1.2. Anatomy of mPFC 
In this section, I will introduce the anatomy of human mPFC and its connections 
with other cortical and subcortical areas. Figure 3-A depicts the architectonic 
subdivisions of the human medial prefrontal cortex. 
There are several ways to divide mPFC into subdivisions (Lemogne, Delaveau, 
Freton, Guionnet, & Fossati, 2012). Some have divided mPFC into two main 
parts: the dorsal (i.e., dorsomedial PFC, dmPFC) and ventral subregions 
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(ventromedial PFC, vmPFC); whereas others use three parts: dorsal, ventral, 
and orbital subregions (medial Orbitofrontal Cortex, or mOFC, Figure 3-B) (e.g., 
Barbey, Krueger, & Grafman, 2009); or dorsal, central, and ventral subregions. 
There seems to be no general agreement on the boundaries of each 
subdivision. The region defined by researchers varied between lesion studies 
and neuroimaging studies and even varied within same study field (e.g., Zald & 
Andreotti, 2010). For example, in some studies, the upper boundary of vmPFC 
extends to the genu of corpus callosum and the lower boundary to the gyrus 
rectus. While in some other studies, researchers have used the z coordinates 
along the MNI space to define the dmPFC and the vmPFC (e.g., dmPFC are 
regions which have z> 10 while vmPFC are those have z<10). This 
inconsistency makes the review difficult. A cluster of voxels could belong to the 
dmPFC in one study but the very same region could fall into the vmPFC in 
another study. Also, in some studies, the term vmPFC actually indicate the 
medial orbital frontal cortex (mOFC), and vice versa. 
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Figure 3. HUMAN PREFRONTAL CORTEX 
(A) Cytoarchitectonic maps of the human medial prefrontal cortex, numbers refer to 
Brodmann areas. Taken from Ridderinkhof et al. (2004). (B) The parcellation of mPFC. 
Note, this is only one of many different parcellation schemes. Taken from Van 
Overwalle et al. (2009). 
The network within mPFC is complex (Ö ngür & Price, 2000), because every 
subdivision has its connection with other subdivisions. Each subdivision (see 
Figure 4)., especially the vmPFC, receives abundant afferents from and has 
plenteous efferents to other brain regions, including cortical, subcortical, and 
brainstem regions (Berendse, Graaf, & Groenewegen, 1992) The large amount 
of inputs and outputs may be one of the reasons why mPFC is involved in so 
many cognitive tasks, including memory, decision making, and self-related 
processing. 
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Figure 4. Anatomical connections of vmPFC. 
Arrows represent directionality. Figures taken from Euston et al. (2012) shows that the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex receives inputs and provide outputs to multiple brain 
cortices and subcortices. Abbreviations: ACd, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; B9, B9 
serotonin cells; DR, dorsal raphe; FrA, frontal association cortex; HDB, horizontal limb 
of the diagonal band of Broca; LC, locus coeruleus; PAG, periaqueductal gray; SN, 
substatia nigra, STN; subthalamic nucleus, VTA, ventral tegmental area. 
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Figure 5. Functions of human mPFC. 
Figure adapted from Van Overwalle& Baetens (2009) and Van Overwalle (2009). 
1.3. mPFC in different cognitive tasks 
Autobiographical memory and episodic imagery are not the only two processes 
that mPFC is often shown to be involved in. Studies have found that mPFC also 
plays a functional role in several other cognitive processes, such as decision-
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making, self-related processing, mind wandering, and theory of mind (for 
reviews, see Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007). Figure 5 shows 
that a wide range of processes all recruit mPFC. Among these process, two of 
them are directly relevant to the specific hypothesis investigated in this thesis, 
i.e., decision-making and self-related processing. Therefore, I introduce these 
two processes and the potential functional roles of mPFC in these tasks, below. 
1.3.1. mPFC in Decision-making 
People begin to make decisions at the very moment that they wake up in the 
morning, and they keep making decisions until the time they fall asleep. In fact, 
we all have to make many decisions every day. For example, which shirt should 
I wear today, the white one, the pink one or the blue one? What about shoes? 
What to have for lunch later, chicken sandwich or salad? Should I go to the gym 
today after work, or should I go home directly, or should I go to the pub with 
friends? Should I drink beer, wine, lager, or cider? Most of these are ordinary 
trivial decisions, whilst others can be important and critical. For example, should 
I take a job offer or turn it down? Should I buy this car or a different one? 
Should I have surgery or should I not? 
The process of decision-making is complicated, even when needing to choose 
between two simple options. Figure 6 is part of the framework often identified by 
studies investigating decision-making, as proposed by Rangel et al. (2008). The 
assumption of this framework is that decisions are made after comparing the 
value of each available option. After the identification of available options, the 
value of each option is computed. The outside world context, the physiological 
and emotional states of the individual are all taken into account during this value 
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computation stage. The individual must then decide which option to choose, 
and this is based on comparing the internal and external value of all options. 
After executing the chosen action and receiving the outcome, the individual will 
compare the actual outcome to the expected one and update self’s own 
knowledge about this option, therefore, the individual is able to make a better 
decision in the future. It is no doubt that to evaluate the value of each option as 
accurate as possible is a critical part of decision-making process and the mPFC 
has been reported to be involved in value-relevant representation and 
processing. 
The value of an option computed in the above mentioned valuation process is 
not invariant across different decision-making situations (e.g., Kable & 
Glimcher, 2007; Kringelbach, O’Doherty, Rolls, & Andrews, 2003). This is 
because the value is calculated based on both internal and external states, and 
both states varies from context to context. For example, hunger level is an 
internal state. When we compute the value of a chocolate bar, the value of the 
chocolate bar would be higher after fasting than after having a feast. That is to 
say, the value computed in this process is a subjective value rather than an 
absolute value. 
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Figure 6. Value based decision-making. 
Figure adapted from Rangel et al. (2008) illustrates five steps in the value-based 
decision-making process. (1) Representation: this first step includes identifying and 
defining all potential options or actions. (2) Valuation: during this step, the value of 
each option is calculated based on one or more valuation systems. Valuation systems 
include the Pavlovian system, Habitual system, and goal-directed system. (3) Action 
selection: a decision is made based on the value of each option. (4) Outcome 
evaluation: after carrying out the chosen action, the outcome will be compared to 
expectation and be recorded for the future. (5) Learning: information gathered from the 
current experience will be used to update knowledge about each option so the 
individual is able to make a better choice next time. 
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The mPFC is consistently engaged in the process of decision making, both in 
the decision-making phase and the reward-receiving phase (for meta-analyses, 
see Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014). In decision-
making studies, one general experimental paradigm is to allow participants 
choose between two alternative options which would deliver a different amount 
of rewards within each experimental trial. For instances, to choose between a 
chocolate bar and an apple, or to choose between receiving £0.50 immediately 
and receiving £5.00 after a 3-month delay (e.g., Leathers & Olson, 2012). 
Another paradigm is for participant to decide whether to accept or refuse a 
proposed offer (e.g., Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009). Studies have examined 
the duration when participants are making decisions (decision-making phase) or 
after they receive a reward (reward-receiving phase). A large number of studies 
have demonstrated that mPFC activity is correlated with the subjective value of 
chosen option during both decision-making phase and reward-receiving phase 
(for meta-analyses, see Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014; for a 
review, see Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011). 
Nevertheless, there are also studies showing that mPFC activity is not 
correlated with the value of chosen option but is instead correlated with the 
value differences between a chosen option and an unchosen option (Basten, 
Biele, Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2010; Boorman, Behrens, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 
2009; FitzGerald, Seymour, & Dolan, 2009; Kim, Adolphs, O’Doherty, & 
Shimojo, 2007; Nicolle et al., 2012; Sripada, Gonzalez, Phan, & Liberzon, 
2011). For example, participants made decisions between two options in a two-
armed bandit task (Boorman et al., 2009) within each trial. The vmPFC activity 
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during decision-making phase was correlated with the difference between a 
chosen value and an unchosen value. Overall, both views do convergent in that 
they suggest that mPFC plays a role in value representation or value-related 
processing during decision making. 
1.3.1.1. Common value 
When making decisions among multiple choices, these choices do not usually 
come from the same category and they can sometimes be very different from 
each other. For example, to choose between attending a friend’s birthday party 
or studying in the library to prepare for an exam. Each option carries diverse 
attributes with the attributes within one option highly dissimilar to those within 
other options. Attributes within the ‘attending the party’ option may include 
friendship, social-interaction while the ‘study’ option includes academic 
performance, personal achievement. 
It has been generally accepted that the value of each attribute is converted into 
a common value via a common scale so the comparison between options from 
different categories is possible (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). The mPFC is believed 
to be critical to this process based on neural imaging studies in human. 
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Figure 7. mPFC involves in common value processing. 
(A) The figure is taken from FitzGerald et al. (2009) shows the activity of vmPFC and 
posterior cingulate cortex was modulated by the differences between choices from 
different categories (i.e., cash and trinkets). (B) Figure taken from Kim et al. (2011) 
shows overlapping response during juice and money expectation. 
Studies have shown that the value of the chosen option or the value differences 
between available options that modulate activity in mPFC is not constrained by 
the type of stimuli or by the potentially available options. In other words, the 
values of items from various categories can modulate activity in mPFC. The 
mPFC activity is correlated with the subjective value of available options no 
matter whether the options are common incentives such as food (Barron, Dolan, 
& Behrens, 2013; Hare et al., 2009), water (Bouret & Richmond, 2010), 
monetary reward (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Kanayet, Opfer, & Cunningham, 
2014; Ludwig et al., 2015; Peters & Büchel, 2009); or inconsumable goods such 
as face and artistic painting (Lebreton, Jorge, Michel, Thirion, & Pessiglione, 
2009), the amount of voluntary donations to charity (Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, 
O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2010), and even physical action (Gläscher, Hampton, & 
O’Doherty, 2009) or warmth on the hand (Grabenhorst, D’Souza, Parris, Rolls, 
& Passingham, 2010). Studies have also found that value representations of 
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two or more different kinds of items overlapped within mPFC within the same 
participants. For example, money and consumer goods (FitzGerald et al., 
2009); money and juice (Kim et al., 2011) in Figure 7; money, snacks, and 
trinkets (Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2009); face and place 
attractiveness (Pegors, Kable, Chatterjee, & Epstein, 2014); scoring a goal in a 
football game and winning monetary reward (Häusler, Becker, Bartling, & 
Weber, 2015). Together with similar results in monkeys (e.g., Padoa-Schioppa 
& Assad, 2008), mPFC might play a critical role in common value scale (for a 
review, see Levy & Glimcher, 2012). That is to say, mPFC encodes or 
represents values of all items based on a common currency regardless the 
categories or types of the items. 
1.3.1.2. Automatic valuation system 
Studies suggest that a valuation process does not occur only when decision 
making is required. For example, activity in mPFC when participants were 
passively viewing different items (e.g., books, CDs, lotteries) was predictive of 
their preferences between two different items during a separate task (Levy & 
Glimcher, 2011). In other words, the valuation system is still working under the 
circumstances when no decision has to be explicitly made. Another study has 
also shown that activities in value-related brain regions, including mPFC, were 
modulated by participants’ preferences even when they were engaging in a 
preference-irrelevant task (i.e., age estimation), which also implies that this 
valuation process is automatic (Lebreton et al., 2009). 
1.3.2. mPFC in Self-related processing 
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1.3.2.1. Self-reflection/ self-referential processing 
The neural mechanism of self-referential processing is an intriguing topic and it 
has been suggested that mPFC may play an essential role in self-reflection or 
self-referential processing. In 2002, Kelley et al. (2002) suggested that self-
referential processing is supported by mPFC, based on the results of their fMRI 
experiment. In Kelley et al. (2002), participants made judgements about trait 
adjectives (e.g., honest) in three conditions: self (e.g., “Does the adjective 
describe you?”), other (e.g., “Does the adjective describe current U.S. President 
George Bush?”), and semantic control. Compared to others-referential 
judgment, self-referential judgment showed higher activity in vmPFC and 
posterior cingulate. On the other hand, other-relevant processing engaged a 
more dorsal subdivision of mPFC. Further studies replicated this result and the 
changes in vmPFC relating to self was the most consistent finding, therefore, 
some researchers suggest that vmPFC is the centre for self-referential or self-
reflection (for meta-analyses, see Hu et al., 2016; Murray, Schaer, & Debbané, 
2012; van der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010). 
Although studies using trait judgments of self or others have consistently shown 
that self- and other-referential processing reflects changes in ventral and dorsal 
areas of mPFC, respectively. However, there were some potential confounds in 
these studies. One potential confounding in trait adjective judgments is that 
when making self-referential judgments, participants tended to rate positive 
traits be more fit than negative ones. Moran et al. (2006) showed that the 
vmPFC still had higher activity when judging self-relevant traits than judging 
other-relevant traits after controlling the emotional valences, which implies the 
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self- and other-referential differentiation within mPFC was not caused by 
emotional valence differences. 
However, does the self- and other-referential differences observed in mPFC 
really reflect differences between the self- and other- representation? Other 
alternative accounts include similarity, intimacy, and familiarity (Wagner, Haxby, 
& Heatherton, 2012) because judgements relating to self and others can also 
differ in these domains. Similar other regard to person who are similar to 
participants themselves in personality, social and political believes, or personal 
interests while familiar others regard to personal familiar ones, such as friends, 
and relatives. Note, familiar famous people are not counted as familiar others. 
In terms of familiarity, a meta-analysis revealed that self-referential processing 
evoked greater vmPFC activity than personal familiar other-referential 
processing although they shared multiple common brain regions (Qin & 
Northoff, 2011). There was one study that attempted to distinguish between the 
influence of similarity and of familiarity (De Brigard, Nathan Spreng, Mitchell, & 
Schacter, 2015). More specifically, participants provided 35 memories of 
decisions made in the past on day 1 (e.g., getting their favourite t-shirt stained 
because they decided to mix whites with colours in the laundry). On day 2, 
participants performed a counterfactual simulation task in an MRI scanner. In 
each trial, participants were instructed to imagine how outcomes would have 
been better for the target person in an event (e.g., “If only I had separated the 
whites from the colours when doing laundry that one time”). The target person 
in each simulation trial could be self, a familiar/similar character, an 
unfamiliar/similar character, or an unfamiliar/dissimilar character. The results 
39 
 
confirmed previous findings, both self and familiar conditions during 
counterfactual simulation involved mPFC but simulating from an others 
perspective involved more dorsal and lateral areas in comparison to the self-
condition. Interestingly, mPFC activity did not differ between simulating 
unfamiliar/similar and unfamiliar/dissimilar others which implies that similarity do 
not modulate mPFC activity. 
Some studies have further demonstrated that vmPFC is involved in evaluating 
similar others (Benoit, Gilbert, Volle, & Burgess, 2010; Jenkins, Macrae, & 
Mitchell, 2008; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005). For example, Benoit and 
colleagues (Benoit et al., 2010) found that when the perceived degree of self-
friend similarity was high (in this case, similar in personalities), the mPFC 
activity differences between self- and friend-referential trait judgments became 
small. But the results of Krienen et al (2010) showed a different pattern when 
participants were judging preferences of target persons in some certain 
situations. For example, self/ prefer window seats to aisle seats when flying. 
The target person could be self, a friend similar to self, a friend dissimilar to self, 
a stranger similar to self, or a stranger dissimilar. The fMRI results confirmed 
that mPFC activity was higher while evaluating self and a close others than 
when evaluating strangers. But similarity did not modulate mPFC activity in this 
social evaluation task. In short, there are no consistent findings on whether the 
similarity is able to modulate the mPFC activity and whether it is an account for 
the self/other-referential processing differences. 
1.3.2.2. Assigning value to self-related contents 
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D’Argembeau (2013) has argued that the function of vmPFC in self-processing 
is to assign values to self-related contents, but not self-reflection. D’Argembeau 
made this claim based on several aspects and evidence. For instance, the 
value of one’s current self is usually higher than the value of self in the past or 
in the future and studies have shown that vmPFC activity was higher when 
thinking about present self than when thinking about past or future selves 
(D’Argembeau, Stawarczyk, Majerus, Collette, Van der Linden, & Salmon, 
2010). Furthermore, vmPFC activity can also vary along with importance of self-
view when making trait judgements (D’Argembeau et al., 2012) and individual 
differences in self-reflection also matched the activity differences of vmPFC 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2014). Both autobiographical memories and episodic 
simulations contain contents which are self-related. Based on D’Argembeau’s 
proposal, mPFC would be expected to show higher activity during recalling an 
item that is relevant to self and has high value compared to recalling a self-
related item with a lower value in autobiographical memory. D’Argembeau’s 
proposal can also explain the results of Bertossi et al. (2016) that vmPFC 
lesioned patients did not only have impairment in imagining self-related 
scenarios but also in imagining others-related (i.e., family members and the 
president of the Italian Republic) scenarios. In general, family members or the 
president of one’s country could be self-related to some degree. And this may 
be the reason why vmPFC patients showed deficits in imaging scenarios related 
to others. 
 
1.3.3. General function of mPFC across tasks 
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Based on the literature mentioned above, it seems that mPFC is consistently 
involved during several cognitive functions, including autobiographical memory 
retrieval, episodic mental simulation, decision-making, and self-related 
processing. Some believe that there is a general function of mPFC across all 
different domains and mPFC is recruited in all these tasks because they all rely 
on this general function of mPFC. 
Euston et al (2012) suggested that the function of mPFC in memory and 
decision making is to learn associations between context or events and required 
responses which in turn could be used to guide adaptive behaviour. To be 
specific, the dmPFC receives inputs from sensorimotor regions while the 
vmPFC receives inputs from subcortical structures and then generate 
appropriate motor and emotional responses after integrating current inputs and 
prior experiences. 
Another hypothesis regarding the general function of vmPFC (Roy, Shohamy, & 
Wager, 2012) suggests that it works as a hub to link concepts from different 
systems and to generate affective meanings to guide adaptive behaviour 
generation. This claim was made based on the findings that vmPFC activity was 
found relevant to various domains, and diseases, including visceromotor 
control, threat regulation, valuation, memory, self-projection, and mood 
disorders. Roy and colleagues argued that, to think of vmPFC function as a 
basic concept would be not sufficient to explain its involvement in divergent 
situations. 
1.4. Research questions 
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In Chapter 1, I first reviewed literature related to the overlap of neural circuits 
between autobiographical memory retrieval and episodic imagery and briefly 
introduced the function of each brain region within the core network. Although 
several hypotheses aim to explain this overlap, none of them focuses on the 
function of mPFC. I also reviewed the involvement of mPFC in different 
cognitive functions, including decision-making and self-related processing. 
Accumulated evidence has suggested that the function of mPFC in decision-
making is related to value processing or value representation. Furthermore, 
some also suggested that the function of mPFC in self-related processing is 
also value representation. Therefore, it is possible that mPFC involvement 
during autobiographical memory, and episodic simulation, may reflect a similar 
role due to representing values of critical elements or components (i.e. items 
which are important in the event or mental imagery based on subjective 
perceived importance) of the memory or imagined scenario irrespective of the 
element type. This hypothesis is similar to the one proposed by D’Argembeau 
that mPFC assigns value to self-related contents during self-referential 
processing (D’Argembeau et al., 2012). 
Therefore the motivation of this thesis is to answer two main research questions 
in regard to the function of mPFC in episodic simulation and autobiographical 
memory retrieval: 
1. Does mPFC function reflect representation of the subjective values for 
imagined components during mental imagining? 
2. Does the mPFC represent subjective values during the retrieval of 
autobiographical memories? 
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To tackle the first question, a paradigm which is able to manipulate participants’ 
subjective values of imagined items is necessary. The logic behind this is that if 
the mPFC represents values of imagined objects, then its activity should be 
higher when people are imagining objects with higher subjective values, and 
vice versa. To exclude potential confounding, it was essential to make sure the 
imagined objects with high subjective values were similar to those with low 
subjective values. Experiment 1 hence aimed to test if it is possible to 
manipulate the subjective values of objects in mental imagery and the 
imagined-value paradigm was adopted to this end. After confirming the validity 
of imagined-value paradigm, this paradigm was carried out in the fMRI scanner 
to answer the first main research question- does the mPFC represent subjective 
values of imagined components during mental imagining? If the answer is yes, 
the BOLD signal of mPFC should be parametrically modulated by the subjective 
values of imagined items. 
The second main research question - does the mPFC represent subjective 
values during retrieval of autobiographical memory? To answer this question, it 
was necessary to collect participants’ real autobiographical memory. Four 
different methods were usually used in investigating autobiographical memory 
and its neuronal mechanism (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; St. Jacques & De 
Brigard, 2015), including generic cues, pre-scan interview, independent 
sources, and prospective methods. Figure 8 exemplifies these four methods. In 
the generic cues method, cues used for eliciting memories are usually common 
nouns. In each single trial, participants receive a cue word, search a proper 
relevant memory and then elaborate it while lying in the scanner. In the pre-
44 
 
scan interview method, participants receive cues and provide memories before 
they are scanned. The scanning happens after a duration of delay. In the 
individual sources method, cues used are gathered from other sources such as 
friends, families, or journals. Participants have no chance to know the cue 
words before the scanning. In the prospective methods, participants take photos 
or wear digital devices which take photos periodically. These photos can be 
used as cues during retrieval phase and can also be used to verify recall 
accuracy. 
Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. For instance, the generic 
cues method can guarantee that when a participant recalls a memory in the 
MRI scanner, the content of recalling has not been influenced by the experience 
of recalling the same memory in the previous session like that in the pre-scan 
interview. However, participants may recall uneven numbers of liked and 
disliked items in the generic cues method. Or, they may always recall liked 
items before disliked items, and this could induce potential confounds. The pre-
scan interview method can prevent these situations happening since 
researchers can to collect enough memories and items from each and every 
category beforehand. However, there is a chance that participants’ memories 
may be contaminated by the experience of recalling these memories during the 
pre-scan interview phase. The advantage of the independent sources method 
and the prospective method is that researchers are allowed to verify the 
authenticity of memories provided by participants. However, it takes longer to 
prepare and finish data collection for these methods. 
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The pre-scan interview was adopted in the present study because it provided 
the chance to control the recall of an equivalent number of high-value objects 
and low-value objects. Although the generic cues method can guarantee less 
contamination from recently retrieval experiences, it does not allow for 
controlling the amount of objects with different subjective values. Apart from the 
subjective values of objects in the memory, taking ratings in regard to these 
memories were also necessary to further support the idea that the mPFC is 
involved in the autobiographical memory for self-relevant values, rather than 
pure value representations in general. 
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Figure 8. Methods used to investigate autobiographical memory 
Figure adopted from St. Jacques and De Brigard, (2015) illustrates four common 
methods: (A) generic cues; (B) pre-scan interview, (C) independent sources, and (D) 
prospective methods. 
47 
 
1.5. Overview of the thesis 
The three experiments in the present thesis were aimed to tackle the questions 
raised above. First, Chapter 2 (Experiment 1) designed and tested the validity of 
an imagined-value paradigm, aimed at modifying participants’ motivations and 
preferences through mental imagery. It demonstrated that people changed their 
subjective values of common items in response to imagining themselves 
exposed to a set of physiological states, for example, instructing an individual to 
imagine themselves in a state of hunger. Following the successful development 
of this paradigm, an imagined-value experiment was next carried out during 
fMRI (Chapter 3). Results support the hypothesis that mPFC represents 
subjective values of imagined components during imaginary scene construction 
and elaboration. Chapter 4 presents a further experiment to extend the findings 
on whether mPFC is involved in subjective value representation during 
autobiographical memory retrieval. More specifically, participants recalled their 
autobiographical events and also items within each event. The subjective 
values of items modulated vmPFC activity during item recall and valuation. 
Finally, Chapter 5 reviews the results of all experiments, discusses the 
similarities and differences between the two fMRI experiments, the importance 
and implication of the results, potential application of imagery ability and 
autobiographical memory recall on the clinical field and makes a summary of 
the present thesis.  
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Chapter 2. Experiment 1- Subjective values of imagined items 
varied in different imagined contexts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter derives partly from Lin, W.-J., Horner, A. J., Bisby, J. A., & Burgess, N. 
(2015). Medial Prefrontal Cortex: Adding Value to Imagined Scenarios. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 27(10), 1957–1967. http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00836  
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To answer the question of whether mPFC activity is modulated by the 
subjective values of imagined objects, we first set out to design a paradigm in 
which we can manipulate the value of key elements within simulated scenarios. 
One might be willing to pay £10.00 for a sandwich only when he is starving and 
has no other choices but not in any other situation. That is to say, people give 
the same object different values under different circumstances (e.g., 
physiological states). This seemed to be a potential way to manipulate the value 
of objects. But if we are to adapt this method to address our hypothesis 
concerning value in imagined scenarios, then the question for us is: Are we able 
to manipulate participants’ motivation and subjective values of objects via 
imagination instead of actually depriving them of specific physiological needs 
(such as food)? 
Imagining eating a certain kind of food can make participants eat less of that 
kind of food later, compared to participants who did not imagine eating this kind 
of food or imaged eating other kinds of food (Morewedge, Huh, & Vosgerau, 
2010). In a behavioural study, Morewedge et al. (2010) required participants to 
imagine themselves putting 3 coins into a laundry machine and eating 30 
M&M’s one by one or imagine putting 30 coins plus eating 3 M&M’s. After this 
imagination, participants were allowed to eat any amount of M&M’s. It turned 
out that participants consumed less M&M’s if they imagined them eating 30 
M&M’s compared to those who imagined eating 3 M&M’s. In another 
experiment with a similar method, participants who imaged eating 3 or 30 
M&M’s or 3 or 30 cheddar cheese cubes and then were later allowed to eat any 
amount of cheddar cheese cubes. The results showed a significant interaction. 
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Participants who imagined eating more cheddar cheese cubes actually then ate 
less than those who had imagined eating less cheddar cheese cubes. In the 
meanwhile, the amount of actual cheese cube consumption did not differ 
between two groups of participants who imagined eating M&M’s. Another study 
even demonstrated that the subjective enjoyment of consuming salty food could 
be decreased if participants were required to rate 60 salty food pictures 
beforehand, but not if they had to rate 60 sweet food pictures (Larson, Redden, 
& Elder, 2014). In general, these studies suggest that mental imagery itself is 
enough to influence our motivation for satisfying our basic needs. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to speculate that to imagine oneself in a hungry state may cause 
a person to experience a higher need for food, which in turn raises food’s 
subjective value. 
Experiment 1 was a behavioural experiment which aimed for testing if 
participants’ preferences changes according to the imagined states on a 
behavioural level. A secondary aim of this experiment was to see if the 
influence of imagined states exists on an implicit level. For these purposes an 
attention bias task was incorporated into the imagery task. 
Studies have shown that visual attention can be biased by pictures of naturally 
threatening stimuli, e.g., spiders or snakes (Lipp, Derakshan, Waters, & Logies, 
2004; Ö hman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). It can also be biased by food-related 
words when participants were hungry (Mogg, Bradley, Hyare, & Lee, 1998), and 
by emotional vocalisations, such as laugh and scream (Van Dessel & Vogt, 
2012). Mogg et al. (1998) used a dot probe paradigm to test attention bias on 
participants who were fasting. In the dot probe paradigm, a word pair- a food-
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relevant word and a food-irrelevant one- showed up on the screen for 500 ms. A 
dot probe occupied either the food-relevant or the food-irrelevant location after 
the word pair disappeared. Participants had to respond to indicate the probe dot 
location. The results showed that hungry participants responded faster when 
the probe occupied the same locations as food-relevant words rather than food-
irrelevant words. It seems that people’s attention can be attracted to the spatial 
location by their need or motivation. Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that 
participants’ attention could be biased by their imagined needs in our study. 
Participants were requested to picture themselves in a certain context (e.g., 
classroom) and in a certain physiological state (e.g., hungry), then they 
encountered two types of objects. One type of objects was able to fulfil their 
imagined need after consumption (e.g., a burger) and another one was not 
(e.g., a bed). Participants then rated how strongly they wanted each object. 
Objects that are potentially able to fulfil imagined needs should trigger higher 
desire than those that are unable to fulfil imagined needs. Simultaneously, 
participants should respond quicker when the probe dot was located in the 
same location as those objects were able to fulfil the imagined needs. 
2.1. Materials and Methods 
2.1.1. Participants 
Fourteen right-handed participants were recruited from the University College 
London student population. The mean age was 23.07 years (SD = 5.12, range 
19- 33) and 10 of them were females. All participants gave written informed 
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consent to participation, in accordance with the local ethics committee 
(1825/003). 
2.1.2. Stimuli and Design 
Four different physiological states of need were used: thirst, coldness, hunger 
and tiredness. A neutral state was used as a baseline condition (instruction for 
the neutral state: Imagine you are just fine. You are not in any state of need but 
just in an ordinary condition). Fifteen spatial contexts were used as the context 
for imagery: beach, kitchen, desert, fields, classroom, aeroplane, forest, office, 
library, playground, church, ship, swimming pool and football stadium. These 
were included to make the imagined scenarios more realistic and because, 
without instruction, participants would be likely to imagine uncontrolled 
backgrounds to facilitate imagery. Each context was combined with four states 
of needs (i.e., thirst, coldness, hunger, and tiredness) once, and this made 60 
state-context combinations. Each location appeared twice when combined with 
the neutral state, thus there were 30 trials with the neutral state. All the 90 trials 
were split into three blocks equally for participants to have two short breaks 
between blocks. Each block contained an equal number of trials with each state 
of need and neutral state, i.e., six trials with thirst, six with coldness, six with 
hunger, six with tiredness, and six with the neutral state. The sequence of these 
trials within each block was randomly assigned. 
Pictures from four categories were used as items, each category contained 
items which were usually used to satisfy one of the four physiological states of 
need. The first category contained water, juice, beer and any other beverages 
used to quench thirst. The second category contained items which were able to 
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be used to help people resist cold weather, such as a fireplace, hot drink, and 
winter clothes. Another category contained food and the final category had 
items used for taking a rest or relieving tiredness included bed, couch, bathtub 
and so on. There were 46 pictures in two of the categories and 44 in the other 
two categories. Therefore, there were 180 pictures in total. All of these pictures 
were obtained from FreeDigitalPhotos.net (http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/). 
In the imagery task, each trial contained one state-context combination as cue 
words and also two different pictures. The relationship between the participant’s 
current imagined state and each item picture during a single trial could either be 
congruent or incongruent. For a congruent item, the type of item presented 
would meet the participant’s current need created by the imagined state. For 
instance, a food picture would be classified as congruent if the state was hunger 
but incongruent if the state was tired, cold or thirsty. Note that, ‘incongruent’ 
items were irrelevant rather than opposite to the current state of need. 
Ambiguous items were never used as ‘incongruent items’ (e.g. hot drink was not 
used in thirst trials). From the two item pictures, sequentially presented during 
each trial, either item could be congruent or incongruent with the current state. 
This provided four possible combinations: congruent-congruent, incongruent-
incongruent, congruent-incongruent, and incongruent-congruent. Importantly, all 
four combinations of items occurred in pseudo-random order across trials, 
allowing us to identify the effects of an individual items’ subjective value, as 
modulated by its congruency with the imagined state. If the state was neutral, 
then both pictures in that trial were neutral pictures. In total, there were 60 
congruent, 60 incongruent, and also 60 neutral pictures in the 90 trials. 
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2.2. Procedure 
Participants were provided with task instructions first and completed a number 
of practice trials. Each trial began with a 0.5s fixation cross at the centre of the 
screen and it was replaced by a pair of state-location cue words (Figure 9). 
Participants were instructed to build up their imaginary scenario based on the 
cue words and try to make it as vivid as possible. For instance, to imagine 
feeling tired in the classroom if the cue pair is “tiredness-classroom”. The cue 
words were presented for 4 seconds and then a blank screen appeared for 8 
seconds, participants had to keep imagining during this period of time. They 
were allowed to close their eyes if they thought it’s helpful for building up their 
imagery scenario. Later, a cross fixation appeared simultaneously with a 0.8s 
beep sound (500Hz). Participants were instructed to open eyes and pay 
attention to the centre of the screen when they hear the beep sound. Two white 
frames along with the central fixation appeared after the 0.5s fixation, one frame 
was located in above the centre and the other one was under the centre. Two 
pictures, one congruent and one incongruent or two neutral ones, replaced the 
two frames for another 0.5s before the probe appeared either in the upper or 
the lower position (the probe appeared in the upper location for 50% trials and 
in the lower location for 50% trials). The probe was a small white square, and it 
stayed on the screen until participants pressed a key to indicate the location of 
the probe. After participants made four subjective judgement ratings, the trial 
ended with a blank screen (4-6 sec, jittered, based on a uniform distribution). 
The first two ratings regarded how much participants wanted each item when 
they met each item within the imagined scenario. The last two were about the 
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vividness of their imagination, state and context separately. All ratings were 
using a 4-point rating scale (1 for not at all, 4 for very much). Based on the 
after-task debriefing, none of the participants were aware of the purpose of the 
attention bias task when they were performing this task. Visual stimuli were 
presented by MATLAB (MathWorks) and COGENT 2000 toolbox 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). 
 
Figure 9. Procedure of Expreiment 1 
This task is a combination of imagery and attention bias task. 
2.3. Behavioural Results 
2.3.1. Probe detection accuracy 
A one-way repeated measure ANOVA was carried out with the factor 
congruency (congruent, incongruent, and neutral) to see if there was any 
different accurate rate of detecting probe locations after different categories of 
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pictures. The main effect was not significant, F(2, 26) = 2.07, p = 0.147. The 
probe detection accuracy after congruent objects was 98% (SD= 0.21), 96% 
(SD= 0.51) for incongruent and 96% (SD= 0.52) for neutral ones. Participants 
had high accuracy in detecting the location of probe no matter whether its 
location was previously occupied by congruent, incongruent, or neutral pictures. 
2.3.2. Probe detection RT 
Trials with errors were removed from this analysis. Reaction times (RT) slower 
than 1000 ms or faster than 150 ms, and those more than 2SD above each 
participant’s mean were considered as outliers and discarded from analyses 
(Mogg et al., 1998; Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2013). In total, 
6.1% of trials were considered outliers. The one-way repeated measure ANOVA 
did not show significant differences of RT among probes presented after 
different types of pictures, F(2, 26) = .40, p = .68. The mean RT was 501 ms for 
those probes presented after congruent pictures, and 504 ms for incongruent 
and 495 for neutral pictures. Thus our imagination task did not produce any 
measurable attention bias. 
2.3.3. Object “subjective values” 
To examine whether participants’ estimation of value (or level of wanting) was 
modulated by the congruency of pictures with imagined-values, a one-way 
repeated measure ANOVA was applied with a factor of congruency (congruent, 
incongruent, and neutral). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
congruency, F(2, 26) = 46.27, p< .001. The mean rating for congruent pictures 
(3.44) was significantly higher than incongruent pictures (mean = 2.31, p< .001) 
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and neutral pictures (mean = 2.26, p< .001) while there was no difference 
between incongruent and neutral pictures (p = 0.71). This result suggests that 
participants’ preferences varied with the imagined state. 
2.4. Discussion 
First, the results of Experiment 1 confirmed the validation of the imagined-value 
paradigm. In other words, to imagine oneself in a certain physiological state can 
change one’s subjective values of imagined objects. This suggests that this 
paradigm is valid for testing the hypothesis that mPFC activity is modulated by 
the subjective values of key objects in our imagined scenarios. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to detect any significant implicit attentional bias 
according to subjective value in this experiment. Although a probe-detection 
task is often used to measure attentional biases, most studies used threat 
stimuli and appetitive stimuli and it remains unknown whether stimuli from other 
types of categories rather than these two can induce attentional biases. Four 
different physiological states of need were used in Experiment 1: hunger, thirst, 
coldness and tiredness. Stimuli included food, beverages, common things used 
to keep people warm or feel relaxed. The null results may be due to the fact that 
the non-food items used were unable to induce an attentional bias. An 
alternative explanation is that unequal perceptual salience among different 
pictures dampened the effect. Some pictures were more perceptually salient 
than others, and they may have attracted participants’ attention even when they 
were served as incongruent pictures. Another possible explanation is that not all 
attentional biases can be detected by the dot probe paradigm (Ö hman et al., 
2001). 
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Some recently published studies also failed to find attention biases in normal 
controls by using the dot probe paradigm (e.g., Emery & Simons, 2015; Jacoby, 
Berman, Graziano, & Abramowitz, 2015; Jacoby, Wheaton, & Abramowitz, 
2016; Miloff, Savva, & Carlbring, 2015; Werthmann et al., 2015) and the effect 
obtained from dot probe task was less reliable than that obtained from modified 
Stroop task (Ataya et al., 2012). It is possible that the dot probe paradigm is not 
a reliable task to investigate attention bias. So it is too early to conclude 
whether an implicit influence of state imagination does or does not exist. 
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Chapter 3. Experiment 2- mPFC activity in the imagined-value 
paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter derives partly from Lin, W.-J., Horner, A. J., Bisby, J. A., & Burgess, N. 
(2015). Medial Prefrontal Cortex: Adding Value to Imagined Scenarios. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 27(10), 1957–1967. http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00836 
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As discussed above, mPFC is involved in decision-making processes during 
decision-making and outcome-receiving phases, due to its roles in reward 
prediction/expectation and value representation. What if the reward is an 
imagined reward rather than a real one? Does mPFC still represent the value of 
the imagined reward? In a study (Bray, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2010), 
researchers found vmPFC was significantly more active in the contrast of real 
reward and punishment. This exact region also showed significantly higher 
activity levels in the imagined reward and baseline contrast and they ruled out 
the possibility that this region only served as a more general function for all 
kinds of imagery. This implies that mPFC may play similar roles in imagined 
reward processing and real reward processing. Therefore, it is possible that 
mPFC plays a role in simulated scenarios similar to its role in autobiographical 
memory retrieval, i.e., representing the subjective values of key elements in 
autobiographical memory or simulated scenarios. 
Given the association between memory and imagery, it is interesting that 
imagery can interact with subjective value and can influence our motivation for 
satisfying basic needs, such as food consumption (Larson et al., 2014; 
Morewedge et al., 2010), and imagining future scenarios in greater detail 
correlates with increased choice of those scenarios (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 
2011; Lebreton et al., 2013; Peters & Büchel, 2010). Human memory can be 
influenced by the value or motivational salience of the to-be-remembered stimuli 
(Erwin & Ferguson, 1979). For instance, fasting people have enhanced memory 
for food pictures (Morris & Dolan, 2001). Given the association between 
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memory and imagery, the memory for items could also be modulated by their 
imagined values. 
The aims of this experiment (Experiment 2) were, (1) to examine whether 
mPFC activity represents the values of elements in imagined scenarios; (2) to 
examine whether the subsequent memory of objects was influenced by the 
imagined physiological states of need. The imagined-value paradigm was used 
again and combined with the fMRI scanner in Experiment 2, based on the 
results of Experiment 1 which showed that this paradigm was able to modify 
people’s subjective ratings of imagined objects by manipulating their imagined 
physiological states. A memory recognition task was also carried out after the 
imagined-value task in order to achieve the second aim of Experiment 2. 
Participants were asked to imagine themselves in some states of need and saw 
pictures of objects to imagine, which may or may not fulfil their imagined needs. 
Based on the results of Experiment 1, imagination should be sufficient to 
influence people’s motivation, so that items which were able to fulfil imagined 
need should have higher value and should be memorised better than those 
were not able to fulfil people’s imagined need. Furthermore, items which were 
able to fulfil participants’ imagined needs should induce higher mPFC activity 
than items which were not able to fulfil imagined needs. 
The procedure of Experiment 2 slightly differs from the procedure of Experiment 
1 because the aim of each experiment was different. First, participants were 
requested to imagine the assigned physiological states and context but not the 
items in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, participants were requested to imagine 
both the scenario and items to enable collecting the imaging data of imagined 
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items with various values. Second, the duration of scenario imagery in 
Experiment 2 was jittered for the purpose to reduce the correlation between 
stimulus presentation and BOLD response. Third, the probe detection task was 
removed from the Experiment 2 because it was irrelevant to the aims of this 
experiment. 
3.1. Materials and Methods 
3.1.1. Participants 
Twenty right-handed participants were recruited from University College London 
student population. One did not finish the task so the data reported here 
concern the remaining nineteen participants (12 female). The mean age of the 
remaining participants was 21.7 years (SD = 2.68, range 19-27). All participants 
gave written informed consent to participate, in accordance with the local ethics 
committee (1825/003). One participant did not complete the post-scan memory 
task so the results from the memory analyses are based on eighteen 
participants. 
3.1.2. Stimuli and Design 
Four different physiological states of need were used: thirst, coldness, hunger 
and tiredness. Neutral state (instruction for neutral state: Imagine you are just 
fine. You are not in any state of need but just in an ordinary condition), was 
used as a baseline condition. Twelve spatial contexts were used: beach, 
kitchen, desert, fields, classroom, airplane, forest, office, library, playground, 
church, and ship. Spatial contexts were included to make the imagined 
scenarios more realistic and because, without instruction, participants would be 
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likely to imagine uncontrolled backgrounds to facilitate imagery. There were 60 
state-context combinations with each appearing only once during the 60 trials of 
the imagery task. 
Pictures from four categories were used as items, each category contained 
items which were usually used to satisfy one of the four physiological states of 
need. The first category contained water, juice, beer and other beverages used 
to quench thirst. The second category contained items which were able to be 
used to help people resist cold weather, such as fireplace, hot drink, and winter 
clothes. Another category contained food and the final category contained items 
used for taking a rest or relieving tiredness included a bed, couch, and bathtub 
and so on. Items which were unrelated to any of the physiological states were 
not included as this group of items would be intrinsically different to the 
congruent or incongruent items in this study. Ambiguous items were never used 
as ‘incongruent items’ (e.g. hot drink was not used in thirst trials). There were 
180 item pictures in total consisting of 45 pictures per category. Among these 
pictures, 120 appeared in the imagery task and another 60 served as new items 
during an old-new recognition test. The assignment of pictures to old items and 
new items was counterbalanced across participants. All pictures were obtained 
from FreeDigitalPhotos.net (http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/). 
In the imagery task, each trial contained one state-context combination 
presented as cue words and also two item pictures (see Figure 10 for an 
example of trial presentation order). The relationship between the participant’s 
current imagined state and each item picture during a single trial could either be 
congruent or incongruent. For a congruent item, the type of item presented 
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would meet the participant’s current need created by the imagined state. For 
instance, a food picture would be classified as congruent if the state was hunger 
but incongruent if the state was tired, cold or thirsty. Note, incongruent could be 
described as ‘neutral’ rather than ‘incongruent’ with respect to the current state. 
From the two item pictures, sequentially presented during each trial, either item 
could be congruent or incongruent with the current state. This provided four 
possible combinations: congruent-congruent, incongruent-incongruent, 
congruent-incongruent, and incongruent-congruent. Importantly, all four 
combinations of items occurred in pseudo random order across trials, allowing 
us to identify the effects of an individual items’ subjective value, as modulated 
by its congruency with the imagined state. Among the 120 item pictures 
presented during the imagery task, twenty-four served as neutral pictures as 
they occurred in a neutral state. The remaining 96 pictures were equally 
assigned as congruent or incongruent items. 
 
 
Figure 10. Procedure of the task in Experiment 2 
(A) the imagery task and (B) the memory task. 
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3.2. Procedure 
3.2.1. Imagery task 
Participants were provided with task instructions prior to scanning and 
completed a number of practice trials outside of the scanner. The entire imagery 
task, consisting of 60 imagery trials, was equally divided into two sessions, and 
scanning lasted for 1 hour in total, including acquisition of a structural scan. See 
Figure 10A for an illustration of stimulus presentation for the imagery task. Each 
trial began with a fixation cross at the centre of the screen which was replaced 
by a pair of state-context cue words after 0.5s. Participants were instructed to 
vividly imagine the context and state according to the cue words provided. The 
state-context cue words were presented for 4s and then a fixation cross 
appeared again (for 8-12s, jittered, based on a uniform distribution), during 
which the participants were instructed to continue imagining. Next, two pictures 
were presented sequentially, each for 4 seconds separated by a 0.5s blank 
screen. Participants were required to incorporate each presented item into their 
imagined scenario during the trial. Participants were explicitly instructed to not 
imagine consuming these items to satisfy their imagined state and its 
associated need. For example, they were required to imagine seeing (but not 
consuming) a chicken burger in a forest whilst they were thirsty (as in Figure 
10A). After a further blank screen (1-4s, jittered, based on a uniform 
distribution), participants made four simple ratings, one at a time. The first two 
ratings asked participants to rate how much they had wanted each item when 
they initially saw it during the trial. The last two separately rated how vividly they 
had imagined the current state and context. All ratings used a 4-point scale (1 
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for not at all, 4 for very much). Each trial ended with a final blank screen (3-6s, 
jittered, based on a uniform distribution). Visual stimuli were presented by 
MATLAB (MathWorks) and COGENT 2000 toolbox 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). 
3.2.2. Memory task 
The memory task took place outside of the scanner after the imagery task was 
completed. Each trial consisted of a 500ms fixation cross followed by a picture 
of an item, and participants were required to judge whether the picture had 
been presented in the imagery task or not (i.e., old/new item recognition 
judgment) and how confident they were of their answer (Figure 10B shows an 
illustration of the memory task). If participants answered ‘new’, participants were 
then asked how much they like that item in their daily lives. If an item was 
judged ‘old’, two further source memory questions were presented to the 
participant to test memory for the associated state and context. To test state, 
one of the state words (hunger, thirst, tired, cold or neutral) was presented and 
participants judged whether that state was the one they had been asked to 
imagine when the recognized item picture had appeared in the imagery task. 
The correct answer was yes for fifty percent of trials, and within these trials, 
forty percent of the state words were congruent with the tested item, forty 
percent were incongruent, and twenty percent were neutral. For the context 
source memory test, all twelve of the contexts were listed to allow participants 
to select the one which had accompanied the recognized item picture. The trial 
ended with the daily subjective rating. There were 180 memory trials in total 
(120 with ‘old’ items and 60 with ‘new’ items). Alternative forced choice was the 
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most efficient way to test memory for the spatial context of an item’s 
presentation, but could not be used to test memory for the physiological state, 
because a simple strategy of guessing the congruent state would be effective 
(e.g., choosing ‘thirst’ when presented with a drink). The congruent state would 
be correct in 40% of trials, the neutral state would be correct in 20% of trials and 
the three incongruent states correct in 13% of trials. Instead, we tested 
participants with yes/no cued recognition of a single state that was chosen to be 
correct 50% of the time irrespective of its congruence with the item. 
3.2.3. fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing 
Functional imaging was performed on a 3T scanner (Siemens TIM Trio) during 
the imagery task. The functional data were acquired with a gradient-echo EPI 
sequence (TR, 3.36s; TE, 30ms; flip angle, 90°; resolution, 3×3×3 mm; 64×74; 
48 slices per volume, slices were tilted 45° up at the front). The total number of 
volumes in each run varied across participants because of the variation of 
response time for each rating (the mean number of volumes was 332 per 
session, range= 304- 380). A high-resolution T1-weighted 3-D structural image 
(1 mm3) was acquired after two sessions of functional scans. A double-echo 
FLASH fieldmap sequence was also recorded. 
Functional images were processed and analyzed with SPM8 (Wellcome Trust 
Centre for Neuroimaging, London UK, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). The first five volumes of each 
scan were discarded for T1 equilibration. Preprocessing procedures included 
bias correction, realignment, unwarping, coregistration, slice timing correction, 
and normalization to the MNI template using the Dartel toolbox. EPI images 
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were smoothed with an isotropic 8mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
One of the participant’s fieldmap scan was not collected so the unwarping 
procedure was skipped in their data. 
3.2.4. Data analysis 
The preprocessed functional images were analysed with general lineal models 
(GLMs). Five GLMs have been estimated for different purposes. All GLMs 
included 6 movement regressors for each session, estimated during 
realignment, as well as two further regressors modelling each session. Based 
on the strong a priori hypothesis about the mPFC, I performed small-volume 
correction (SVC) within a combined anatomical mask of these regions: bilateral 
mPFC which included both the dorsal and ventral regions of mPFC (volume ~ 
53,493 mm3). This mask was derived from the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et 
al., 2002), as implemented in the WFU PickAtlas Tool (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, 
& Burdette, 2003).This mask contained bilateral superior frontal gyrus, medial 
frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate and cingulate gyrus. Within these small volumes 
I report effects that survive p<.05 FWE correction. For completeness, I also 
report effects at p<.001 uncorrected across the whole brain, however caution is 
needed in interpretation of these effects. 
The first model (GLM1) was a parametric modulation analysis, searching for 
regions that correlated with the subjective value of an item during states of 
need. The first-level model contained 7 regressors per session: (1) imagining a 
state of need, (2) imagining a neutral state, (3) imagining an item in a state of 
need, (4) a parametric modulator of the item regressor based on the 
participant’s normalised subjective value of each item (i.e., rating in imagery- 
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everyday rating), (5) imagining an item in a neutral state, (6) ITI periods and (7) 
key-presses. Trial periods were modelled with a boxcar function for the entire 
length of each period (e.g., the 4s of imaging an item), convolved with the 
canonical HRF. The second-level analysis was a one-sample t-test on the 
parameter estimates from the parametric modulator (regressor 4) averaged 
across the two sessions. For the parametric modulation I used the subjective 
rating of each item when imagined in the state of need of the current trial minus 
the subjective rating of the item in the participant’s daily life, given after the 
scanning session. This calculation allowed us to control for variations in the 
participants’ baseline preference for the various items. The range of these 
normalised subjective ratings was from -3 to 3. 
The second model (GLM2) was used for comparing imagination of congruent 
items versus incongruent items (given that the first GLM collapsed across these 
conditions to maximize power in the parametric modulation analysis), and also 
for comparing imagining states of needs versus neutral states. This model 
included seven regressors per session: (1) imagining a state of need, (2) 
imagining a neutral state, (3) imagining a congruent item in a state of need, (4) 
imagining an incongruent item in a state of need, (5) imagining an item in a 
neutral state, (6) ITI periods and (7) key-presses. Parameter estimates for (1) 
imaging a state of need, (2) imaging a neutral state, (3) imagining a congruent 
item in a state of need and (4) imagining an incongruent item in a state of need, 
averaged across the two sessions, were entered into a second-level model. A 
separate regressor was also included for each individual subject that consisted 
of a '1' for each condition for that specific participant (i.e., subject effects). A 
70 
 
third model (GLM3) aimed to test the subsequent memory effect for imagined 
items. The model was similar to GLM1, but replaced the subjective value 
parametric modulator with a modulator based on subsequent memory. The 
model included 6 regressors per session: (1) imagining a state of need, (2) 
imagining a neutral state, (3) imagining an item (in either a state of need or 
neutral state), (4) a parametric modulator of the previous regressor based on 
subsequent memory for the item, (5) ITI periods and (6) key-presses. Note that 
the parametric modulator focused on subject value focused on item imagination 
during a state of need, as we were specifically interested in how states of need 
modulated subjective value. For the subsequent memory modulator I included 
all item imagination trials (included during neutral states) to maximize power. 
Subsequent memory was parameterized as a transformed confidence rating to 
maximize sensitivity. Participants’ 1-4 confidence ratings for old and new items 
at test were transformed into a measure of successful memory performance by 
combining ratings for item ‘hits’ with negative ratings for item ‘misses’ (e.g. a 
‘miss’ given a confidence rating of 4 would become -4 in the parametric 
modulator). The second-level analysis was a one-sample t-test on the 
parameter estimates from the parametric modulator (regressor 4) averaged 
across the two sessions. 
The final two models (GLM4 & GLM5) aimed to test the subsequent memory 
effect for the state of need (GLM4) and the context (GLM5) in which items were 
imagined (i.e. two types of source memory). GLM4 contained 7 regressors per 
session: (1) imagining a state of need, (2) imagining a neutral state, (3) item 
imagination trials for which the item and state of need are subsequently 
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remembered, (4) item imagination trials for which the item but not the state is 
remembered, (5) item imagination trials for which the item is not remembered, 
(6) ITI periods and (7) key-presses. GLM5 was similar to GLM4, but split item 
imagination trials (regressors 3-5) by according with whether the context (rather 
than the state) was remembered. Second-level models for each GLM were 
paired t-test comparing either state or context hits vs misses (regressors 3 and 
4) averaged across the two sessions. 
Note separate GLMs were built for each analysis of interest. This was due to 
the overlapping nature of certain regressors. In particular, the categorical 
congruent vs incongruent contrast correlated with the related, but more 
sensitive, item-by-item parametric modulation of value by state. Further, the 
parametric modulators relating to subsequent memory and subjective value 
were also correlated. Despite the overlapping nature of these regressors of 
interest, our separate GLMs revealed distinct activation patterns. 
3.3. Behavioural Results 
3.3.1. The subjective value of items in imagery 
If the manipulation of imagined state work, the proportion of high-value 
congruent items should be high and the proportion of low-value congruent items 
should be low. In the meanwhile, the proportion of high-value incongruent items 
should be low, and the proportion of low-value incongruent items should be 
high. A three-way repeated measure ANOVAs with the situation (two levels: 
everyday rating and rating during imagery), rating (1-4), and category 
(congruent, incongruent, and neutral) was carried out to verify if the paradigm 
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work. The dependent measure was the mean proportion of trials receiving the 
rating specified by the ‘rating’ factor. The three-way interaction was significant 
(F(6, 102) = 18.7, p < .001) so further analyses were carried out which revealed 
that the distributions of ratings differed between categories for ratings during 
imagery (rating* category F(6, 102) = 27.4, p < .001), but not for everyday 
ratings (rating* category F(6, 102) = .662, p = .68). Thus, it was only when 
participants imagined being in a specific state of need that the subjective value 
of the items differed between the “congruent” and “incongruent” conditions. 
Table 1 shows that a greater proportion of congruent items had positive 
subjective value (controlling for baseline value, i.e. rating of imagined value – 
everyday rating) (39.67%), while most incongruent items had negative 
subjective values (60.25%). This suggests that the participants indeed followed 
the instruction to imagine the assigned state of need and that those imagined 
states influenced the subjective value of the item on that trial. 
Another two-way repeated measure ANOVA with congruency between state 
question word and item (congruent and incongruent) and rating (1-4) as within 
subject variables was carried out to test whether the preceding state question 
might bias ratings (e.g. ‘hungry’ increasing ratings for food items). There was no 
significant interaction between congruency and rating (F(3, 51) = .40; p = .75), 
suggesting that the everyday ratings were not influenced by the preceding 
source memory questions. 
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Table 1 Percentage of subjective values of items during imagery 
Percentage of subjective values of items during imagery, according to whether they 
were imagined in a congruent, incongruent or neutral state of need, controlling for 
baseline value (value during imagery – everyday value). 
 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Congruent 2.36% 5.20% 17.66% 35.10% 23.27% 11.95% 4.45% 
Incongruent 6.63% 18.64% 34.98% 27.31% 8.93% 2.94% 0.58% 
Neutral 6.35% 18.03% 30.90% 28.32% 11.43% 4.97% 0.00% 
3.3.2. Old-new recognition 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA across congruency (congruent, 
incongruent, and neutral) was carried out to test for differences in hit rate 
among different categories of items. The results revealed a significant main 
effect of congruency, F(2, 34) = 9.01, p< .001 (see Figure 11A for memory 
performance). Pairwise comparisons showed that hit rate was higher for 
congruent items than for incongruent (t(17) = 5.16, p< .001) and neutral (t(17) = 
3.14, p = .006) items. However, there was no significant difference between 
incongruent and neutral items (t(17) = .35, p = .73). This result suggests that 
participants had better memory for items which were able to fulfil their needs in 
the imagined state. Participants showed a high correct rejection rate for new 
items (87%). Table 2 shows confidence ratings across all responses. 
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Figure 11. Behavioral results for the memory task 
A, Mean values of hit rate in the item recognition memory task. B and C, Mean 
performance in the source recognition task- for the state of need (B) and the spatial 
context (C). Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM. 
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Table 2 Confidence ratings 
Percentage of confidence ratings given for the different types of response in the old-
new item recognition task. 
 Hit Miss False Alarm 
Correct 
Rejection 
1 3.9% 16.7% 17.0% 10.4% 
2 14.1% 19.8% 29.1% 15.3% 
3 20.1% 26.8% 29.1% 23.5% 
4 61.9% 36.7% 24.8% 50.7% 
 
A two-way repeated measure ANOVA with order of presentation (two levels: 
first or second), and category (three levels: congruent, incongruent, and neutral) 
as within-subject factors on the subjective ratings and subsequent memory 
scores was also carried out to test whether the results varied with the order in 
which items were presented within a trial. The results shows that the order of 
presentation during encoding did not affect item memory (order, F(1,17) = .198, 
p = .660; category, F(2,34) = 9.215, p= .001 order*category, F(2,34) = 1.89, p 
= .167), and there was a non-significant trend towards lower ratings for the first 
versus second item (order*category, F(2, 34) = 1.05, p = .36; order, F(1, 17) = 
3.92, p = .064)). 
3.3.3. Source memory 
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Source memory performance for correctly associating the imagined state with 
the recognized item was analysed using a similar one-way ANOVA. There was 
a significant main effect of item congruency (F(2, 34) = 17.30, p < .001). 
Pairwise comparisons showed that the conditional state source hit rate (source 
hits over item hits) for congruent items was significantly higher than for 
incongruent items (t(17) = 6.16, p < .001) and neutral items (t(17) = 5.44, p 
< .001) while there was no significant difference between the latter two 
categories (t(17) = .17, p = .864). See Figure 11B. Although participants 
showed a response bias towards accepting the state (answering ‘yes’) when it 
was congruent (55.6% responses were yes) or neutral (54.2% yes) relative to 
the item, and ‘no’ when it was incongruent (41% responses for incongruent 
items were no), this response bias could not account for the results (the correct 
proportion of ‘yes’ responses being 50% in both cases – so that a bias cannot 
improve source accuracy scores, which are measured as % correct). 
Analysis of source memory performance for the imagined spatial context (e.g., 
‘beach’) within the recognized item showed no significant main effect of item 
congruency (F(2, 34) = .889, p = .42; see Figure 11C for context source 
memory performance). It is possible that this reflects the irrelevance of spatial 
context to the subjective ratings which the participants are required to give on 
each trial, or that any small effects of congruency on context-source memory 
were obscured by low levels of performance (chance = 8%) although 
performance was above chance in each category (congruent: t(17) = 3.96, 
p= .001; incongruent: t(17) = 4.48, p < .001; neutral: t(17) = 2.14, p = .047). 
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In general, behavioural results supported the prediction. Subjective values of 
items support the validity of our imagine-need paradigm. There was also a 
greater recognition performance for congruent than incongruent items, and 
better memory for the imagined state of congruent than incongruent items. In 
other words, there was better memory performance for items when their value 
was congruent with the imagined state 
3.4. fMRI Results 
3.4.1. Subjective value of items in imagery (GLM1) 
First, the analysis focused on the main prediction of Experiment 2: that the 
subjective value of items in imagined scenarios would correlate with the BOLD 
response in the mPFC. To isolate imagined value from differences in the 
intrinsic values of the items used I calculated the participant’s subjective value 
for the item when imagining it in the current state of need minus their subjective 
value for the same item in their daily life. This parametric modulator revealed an 
effect in the mPFC (+9, +57, +12, Z = 3.98; p<.05 FWE SVC). See Figure 12. 
Therefore the results provide evidence that mPFC represents the values of 
elements in imagined scenarios, controlling for variations in their intrinsic value 
in other situations. 
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Figure 12. mPFC during object imagination 
The activation of mPFC during imagination of an object during a state of need varied 
according to the extent to which the subjective value of item was modulated by the 
imagined state of need. All peaks significant at p< .001, uncorrected. (The redline 
depicts the area of mPFC mask used in SVC analysis.) 
Given the complexity of the imagined-value task, it is important to rule out other 
explanations for the main mPFC result. This is particularly important given the 
overlapping nature of certain experimental factors (see Methods). In short, none 
of the subsequent analyses in Experiment 2 showed an effect in mPFC, even at 
a lenient p<.001 uncorrected threshold. However, these analyses did reveal 
effects in other regions at this threshold. These results were reported for 
completeness but note they should be treated with caution given that they do 
not survive correction for multiple comparisons. 
3.4.2. Imagining states of need, and item congruency with need 
(GLM2) 
Compared to imagination of a neutral state, imagination of states of 
physiological need showed greater activation in bilateral insula (MNI 
coordinates of peak activations: -39, -6, -3, Z = 3.27; +45, +15, +3, Z = 3.15; 
p< .001, uncorrected; Figure 13A). By contrasting imagery for congruent versus 
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incongruent items, a region in the basal ganglia was identified – the caudate 
nucleus (+3, +9, +6, Z = 3.60; -6, +9, +6, Z = 3.56, p< .001, uncorrected; Figure 
13B). Since congruent items had higher subjective value than incongruent ones, 
a small volume corrected analysis for the congruent-incongruent contrast in the 
mPFC ROI was also carried out, but found no significant effect. 
 
Figure 13. Imagining states of need> imagining the neutral state 
A, Bilateral insula showed higher activation when participants were imagining states of 
need compared to imagining the neutral state. B, The caudate showed greater 
activation for imagining a state-congruent item than a state-incongruent item. All peaks 
significant at p< .001, uncorrected (colour bars indicate equivalent Z scores). 
I also investigated whether the fMRI correlates of an item’s value or state-
congruency varied between the first and second item, finding a non-significant 
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trend towards a greater effect of state-congruency for the first versus second 
item in the vmPFC (-3, 33, -12; p=0.083 FWE, SVC). However, these could not 
influence the findings themselves, as the manipulation of state-congruency was 
counterbalanced across items. 
3.4.3. Subsequent memory effects (GLM3) 
This parametric modulation analysis showed that BOLD signal in right amygdala 
(+33, -3, -30; Z = 3.27) and left anterior hippocampus (-21, -12, -18; Z = 3.33), 
when participants were imagining items, were significantly correlated with 
participants’ subsequent memory (p< .001, uncorrected, Figure 14). Note, the 
subsequent memory modulator combined categorical subsequent memory 
status (i.e., hits and misses) with subjective confidence, revealing linear 
increases in BOLD response from -4 (high confidence misses) to +4 (high 
confidence hits). No other significant activity was revealed in this analysis. 
No significant activations were found corresponding to subsequent source 
memory effects for state (GLM4) or for context (GLM5), i.e. the comparisons of 
imagery for items that became source hits versus source misses. This may 
reflect a lack of power, given the relatively low trial numbers in specific 
conditions (i.e., source misses for state), and the absence of a parametric 
measure like the confidence ratings used for item memory. 
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Figure 14. Subsequent memory 
Greater activity was seen during encoding in left hippocampus (upper row) and right 
amygdala (lower row) for items that were subsequently correctly recognised with high 
confidence compared to subsequently non-recognised items. All peaks significant at 
p< .001, uncorrected. 
3.5. Discussion 
I was interested in the potential role of medial prefrontal cortex in contributing 
subjective value to the contents of imagery. The imagined-value paradigm 
provides a way to measure this by manipulating subjective value of imagined 
items with respect to imagined physiological need. In line with the results of 
Experiment 1, the behavioural results of Experiment 2 suggest the manipulation 
was valid and the imaging results support the hypothesis that mPFC activity 
reflects the subjective value of elements in imagined scenarios. 
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The manipulation of imagined need succeeded in altering the subjective value 
of elements within imagined scenarios in that participants indicated higher 
ratings for items congruent with (i.e. likely to satisfy) the state of need. The 
subsequent recognition memory for items also supports the success of this 
manipulation. Items which were able to fulfil people’s imaginary needs showed 
greater subsequent memory, both in being better recognized and by being 
better associated to the state of need in which they were presented. This could 
be because to imagine a congruent item in the imagined scenario is more 
consistent with our daily life experiences and this enabled participants to have a 
richer imagination. Similarly, congruent items might fit more readily into a pre-
existing ‘schema’ allowing for a more rapid integration of the item and imagined 
state (Bartlett, 1932; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Tse et al., 2007). Equally, 
congruent items might have been better remembered because more valuable 
scenarios tend to be more strongly represented in memory-related areas 
(Lebreton et al., 2009; Wittmann et al., 2005).  
The instruction to imagine states of physiological need was accompanied by 
increased activity in the insula compared to neutral states, albeit at an 
uncorrected threshold. This would be consistent with studies showing insular 
activation corresponding to interoception of actual physiological states (Craig, 
2003), including thermo sensation (Craig, Chen, Bandy, & Reiman, 2000), and 
hunger (Tataranni et al., 1999). One might wonder whether people are able to 
imagine themselves in different physiological states, because physiological 
states are not usually thought to be under cognitive control. However, 
involuntary physiological signs can be influenced by imagination, e.g. pupil 
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dilation can be affected by imagining dark or light environments (Laeng & 
Sulutvedt, 2013). 
I was interested in the process by which subjective value is afforded to an item 
within an imagined scenario. To investigate this I looked for an fMRI signal 
matching the modulation of an item’s subjective value by the imagined state of 
need, i.e. a regressor formed from the subjective rating of the item when 
imagined as part of a specific scenario minus the subjective rating of that item in 
daily life. I found of activity in mPFC, both in a more superior region and the 
ventral region of mPFC (albeit at an uncorrected threshold for the latter region), 
following this pattern. This is consistent with our hypothesis for the role of 
mPFC in imagery. Thus, beyond the representation of the subjective value of 
choices in decision making, the mPFC may also play a role in representing the 
value of items in imagined scenarios more generally. This more general role 
might begin to explain its involvement in autobiographical memory retrieval or 
episodic future thinking, as well as tasks with an implied component of choice 
such as planning. Indeed, mPFC activation has been seen together with 
hippocampal activation during the imagination of rewarding future situations in a 
decision task (Lebreton et al., 2013). 
In general, congruent items were rated as more valuable than incongruent 
ones. Congruent items might be valuable because of their utility in a specific 
context (i.e., a congruent state) (Hare, Malmaud, & Rangel, 2011) or because 
congruent items are more self-relevant in a congruent state (D’Argembeau, 
2013). Could the results been observed in mPFC be caused by semantic 
congruency effect? To examine the effect of semantic congruency itself, I 
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simply compared the imagination of explicitly congruent or incongruent items, 
finding activity in the caudate nucleus (but not in mPFC, where the difference in 
activity was some way below threshold, at p=0.06 uncorrected). Thus, there is 
little support for a semantic interpretation of the mPFC activity I observed. The 
representation of the combined scenario may involve the striatum, via increased 
consolidation of the congruent state-item association, consistent with some 
rodent studies of consolidation (Pennartz et al., 2004). Alternatively, the striatal 
activation may reflect the involvement of these areas in reward-related 
processing (e.g., Brian Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007), 
in the sense that the imagined interaction with the congruent item seems more 
rewarding in nature (although we forbade imagined consummation of items). 
Although in general, congruent items have higher subjective ratings and 
incongruent items have lower subjective ratings, but there was no mPFC effect 
in the congruent vs. incongruent contrast. A potential explanation is because 
the power of parametric modulator analysis is stronger than that in a pairwise 
comparison. 
The behavioural results demonstrate a higher recognition rate for congruent 
items. This memory effect could relate to schema theory: perhaps the encoding 
of new information (i.e. a congruent item) benefits from being congruent rather 
than incongruent with the existing scenario. The mPFC has been implicated in 
incorporating new information into existing knowledge structures (Benchenane 
et al., 2010; Tse et al., 2011; van Kesteren et al., 2013; van Kesteren, 
Rijpkema, Ruiter, & Fernández, 2010; van Kesteren, Ruiter, Fernández, & 
Henson, 2012). However, mPFC did not show a significant subsequent memory 
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effect. Subsequent memory for items was related to activity in the anterior 
medial temporal lobe during encoding, consistent with several previous studies 
implicating the hippocampus (Wagner, 1998). Our subsequent memory effects 
also extended into the amygdala. This may be consistent with a role for the 
amygdala in item memory (Farovik, Place, Miller, & Eichenbaum, 2011; 
Kensinger, Addis, & Atapattu, 2011; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Ranganath, 
2010), or with amygdala involvement in enhancing memory for items with 
affective salience (Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 1999) or intrinsic value as a 
reinforcer (Rolls, 2005). Unfortunately, we did not have enough statistical power 
to analyse subsequent memory effects separately in congruent, neutral and 
incongruent items to address these possibilities.  
The recollection of autobiographical information has been associated with a 
network of brain regions. Although many posterior regions have a hypothesized 
functional role within this network (Byrne et al., 2007; Cabeza & St. Jacques, 
2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009; Schacter et al., 2012), the mPFC has 
received somewhat less attention. Autobiographical memories tend to be highly 
personal and value-laden. For example, we are more likely to remember the 
experience of having a cup of hot tea after walking outdoors for hours on a cold 
winter day than having a cup of tea in an ordinary afternoon. Given its 
association with value in decision making, and with the value afforded by 
imagined scenarios in the present study and related studies (Benoit, Szpunar, & 
Schacter, 2014; Gross et al., 2014; Nieuwenhuis & Takashima, 2011), mPFC 
activity may reflect representation of the value of recollected information (see 
also D’Argembeau, 2013). This is perhaps one reason why mPFC is typically 
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not seen in more traditional episodic memory tasks, such as word recognition, 
where memory for such items may be high, but little value is associated with the 
retrieved items. Indeed, the subjective value associated with items may be one 
critical difference between typical autobiographical and episodic memory tasks. 
To conclude, we have developed a new paradigm for looking at the interaction 
of imagery and value. We have validated it behaviourally via subjective value 
ratings and subsequent memory effects. Supporting our hypothesis, we found 
activity in the mPFC corresponding to the subjective value that an item is 
afforded by the imagined scenario. This suggests an extension of the well-
known role of mPFC in representing value during decision making, and offers a 
potential explanation of its involvement in imagery and autobiographical 
memory retrieval. 
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Chapter 4. Experiment 3- mPFC activity in autobiographical 
memory recall 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter derives partly from Lin, W.-J., Horner, A. J., & Burgess, N. (2016). 
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex, adding value to autobiographical memories. Scientific 
Reports, 6, 28630. http://doi.org/10.1038/srep28630 
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The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) has consistently been shown to play a role 
in autobiographical memory (AM) recall (for reviews, see Addis et al., 2007; 
Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009; Svoboda, McKinnon, 
& Levine, 2006), recollection of self-relevant information (Macrae et al., 2004; 
Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013; Moore III, Merchant, Kahn, & Pfeifer, 2014; 
Summerfield, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2009), the imagination of novel scenarios 
(for reviews, see Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2012), emotional 
regulation during autobiographical memory recall (Ford, Morris, & Kensinger, 
2013; Holland & Kensinger, 2012) and linking self-relevance and value 
(D’Argembeau, Stawarczyk, Majerus, Collette, Van der Linden, Feyers, et al., 
2010; D’Argembeau et al., 2012), with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), in particular, being reliably involved. Whilst this highlights that mPFC 
has an important role in AM and imagery, it remains unclear exactly what 
functional role it provides. 
It is well-established that mPFC also plays a role in representing the values of 
choice during decision making (for a review, see Levy & Glimcher, 2012). In 
addition, judgements relating to the self are believed to be processed in more 
ventral mPFC while other-relevant processing is associated with more dorsal 
mPFC (for a review, see Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012). Taken 
together, these observations suggest that mPFC might contribute to imagination 
and AM by representing the subjective value of the contents of imagined or 
recollected scenarios, and that increasing the personal relevance of these 
contents might involve more ventral regions of mPFC. 
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The predicted modulation of mPFC activity by the value of elements within 
imagined scenarios has recently been observed (Benoit et al., 2014; W.-J. Lin, 
Horner, Bisby, & Burgess, 2015). In both studies, participants imagined novel 
scenarios and rated the subjective values of the imagined contents, with these 
ratings being found to correlate with activity in mPFC. Here we sought to 
investigate the hypothesis that activity in mPFC might reflect the values of 
elements of autobiographical memories, and the related hypothesis that the 
more personally relevant AMs used here might be reflected in activity in more 
ventral regions within mPFC than seen with the novel scenarios used in 
previous studies. 
In Experiment 2, activity in mPFC was modulated by participants’ subjective 
evaluation of common items present in newly imagined scenarios. In the 
present study, we used a similar procedure but replaced the imagined scenarios 
and imagined items with participants’ real autobiographical memories and the 
items that were remembered within them. On day1 I asked participants to recall 
AMs, including six items within each event that were either liked or disliked at 
the time of the event. They characterized each AM in terms of its pleasantness, 
recall vividness (Daselaar et al., 2008), personal significance, recall frequency, 
recall difficulty, emotional intensity and time since it happened, and also 
reported the familiarity of the items at the time of the event (as familiarity has 
also been linked to mPFC activity during imagery (Benoit et al., 2014; Szpunar, 
Chan, & McDermott, 2009)). On day 2, in an fMRI scanner, participants recalled 
AMs and then rated the values of four of the items in each event, and the 
vividness with which each was brought to mind. 
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4.1. Behavioural Pilot 
Before I carried out the current experiment in the fMRI scanner, the 
experimental paradigm was tested without scanning. This behavioural pilot was 
carried out to make sure that participants were able to recall enough memories 
and were able to provide those necessary details. 
Nine participants were recruited from UCL (age range= 20-32 yrs). All 
participants gave written informed consent before taking part in the experiment. 
All experimental protocols were approved by the UCL research ethics 
committee (1338/006), and all data collection and analyses were carried out by 
the approved guidelines. 
The test contained in two parts: AM-interview in Day1 and test in Day2. In the 
AM-interview, participants had to recall and elaborate 40 autobiographical 
memory events based on free association with word-cues we provided. Then 
they had to choose six items from each event; three were items which they liked 
at the time when the event occurred, and the other three were items which they 
did not like at that time. They also had to rate each remembered event for the 
level of detail, emotional valence, personal significance, vividness, and recall 
frequency, using a 4-point scale. 
In the test phase, cues were presented one by one and participants had 8-12 
seconds to recall the corresponding events again. Four items were selected 
from each event, and these items were presented as words one by one on the 
screen. Participants had to recall each item. Half of these items were those 
identified as liked by participants in the AM-interview and the other half were 
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disliked ones. Participants also rated how much they liked each item on a 5-
point scale immediately after recalling it. 
All the participants were able to recall and elaborate 40 specific memories 
based on the cues we provided. They were also able to provide enough 
important and non-important items within each memory. Moreover, they gave 
liked items higher likability ratings than disliked items during recall (see Figure 
15), which suggests that participants did not randomly categorise items into 
liked and disliked categories. In general, the results of this behavioural pilot 
experiment suggested the feasibility of this paradigm. 
 
Figure 15. Percentage of liked and disliked items across ratings 1-5 during 
recall 
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1. Participants 
Twenty-seven right-handed participants from University College London were 
recruited via advertisement. Two participants failed to finish the experiment and 
therefore all the results reported here were from the remaining 25 (11 males, 
mean age=25.6, SD=4.62, range=20-35). All participants gave written informed 
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consent before taking part in the experiment. All experimental protocols were 
approved by the UCL research ethics committee (1338/006), and all data 
collection and analyses were carried out in accordance with the approved 
guidelines. 
4.2.2. Stimuli 
An AM interview procedure (Maguire, 2001) was adopted to collect participants’ 
autobiographical memories. Cue words used in the AM interview were 40 nouns 
chosen from Clark and Paivio’s (Clark & Paivio, 2004) extended norms. All of 
these words have high ratings in frequency (mean Thorndike-Lorge 
frequency=1.88, SD=0.15), imageability (mean=6.32, SD = 0.39), and 
concreteness (mean = 6.59, SD = 0.55). 
 
Figure 16. Day 2: Recall in scanner 
Procedure of autobiographical memory recall and item rating in the scanner on Day2. 
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4.3. Procedure 
All participants took part in the experiment on two consecutive days – the AM 
interview on Day 1 and recall in the scanner on Day 2 (Figure 16). Conducting a 
separate scanning session (on Day 2, as opposed to scanning the Day 1 
interview) allowed us to have better control over several factors during memory 
and item retrieval in the scanner on Day 2, for instance, counterbalancing the 
order in which liked and disliked items were recalled and controlling the duration 
allowed for AM retrieval which can be extremely varied on Day 1. Although 
retrieval on Day 2 might be affected by the recall or rating process on Day 1 
(Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007), participants were instructed to focus on their 
original memories. During the AM interview, all of the forty cue words were 
presented to participants one by one. Participants were instructed to freely 
associate one time- and location-specific autobiographical event to each cue 
word and verbally elaborate the details of the event. Details included the age of 
the event, location, people involved, and things that happened in the event. 
Events could range in age from their childhood to the day before the interview. 
A succinct memory title for each event was created by participants themselves 
as a reminder of the event to be used for recall on Day 2.  
Ratings for each event were also required, including the pleasantness, recall 
vividness and emotional intensity evoked by the event, as well as its personal 
significance, recall frequency since the experience, and recall difficulty. These 
ratings are common in autobiographical memory studies (e.g., Bonnici et al., 
2012; Ryan et al., 2001). Some of these ratings may be highly correlated with 
each other, for example, personal significance and emotional intensity. 
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However, they were not identical, for example one participant had a highly 
positive affect when having delicious ice cream on a hot summer 10 years ago 
but this delicious-ice-cream memory did not have much personal significance. 
Participants also had to provide three items they liked and three they did not like 
from each event, as well as rating how familiar they were with each item at the 
moment when the event originally occurred. People could not be given as liked 
or disliked items. All the ratings in this study were on a scale from one to four. 
To give readers a better understanding of the types of event that were 
described, we present an example event from one of the participants: 
‘The word “Journal” reminds me that I once stole my sister’s diary. This happened 
when I was 12, so that’s 2005 and it was December. My sister was keeping a 
diary since that summer but she never allowed me to read it. One day, I decided 
to steal it. It wasn’t so hard because I knew exactly where she hid it in our 
bedroom. I took her diary and sat on the floor next to my bed and began to read 
it. I liked the cover of the diary, it’s my favourite colour. In the first few pages, 
most of the contents were mundane things, so I got bored very soon. But I found 
one exciting page just before I wanted to stop reading - she was secretly in love 
with Orlando Bloom! She kept all the information about him and described how 
much she loves him. Just a few seconds after I found out this secret, I heard 
footsteps outside the room in the corridor. It was my sister. I was panicked and 
found no time for me to put the diary back in its place so I hid it under my duvet. 
She came into the room and realized what I was doing immediately. She got 
furious. We definitely had a very serious fight but I don’t really remember that part 
actually. So the three things I liked were the cover of that diary, the carpet on the 
floor I was sitting on, and my duvet. I didn’t like the drawer my sister hid her diary, 
the pair of shoes my sister was wearing and maybe the dome light in our room. 
I’m going to name this memory “Stealing my sister’s diary”.’ 
Although six items were obtained for each event on Day 1, only four were 
presented on Day 2 - two liked and two disliked items. Only four items were 
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used in the recall task to (1) shorten the duration that participants had to stay in 
the scanner and (2) avoid potential categorical differences between the ‘liked’ 
and ‘disliked’ items used for a given participant (e.g., avoiding all the liked items 
being snacks and all the disliked items being vegetables). The items used on 
Day 2 were selected by the experimenter and participants did not know which 
had been included until they saw them in the scanner. A liked item was chosen 
if (1) the same item or a very similar item had not been chosen yet, or (2) a 
similar item also existed among disliked items. The same principles applied 
when choosing disliked items. 
During the recall task in the scanner on Day 2, participants recalled all forty 
memories and four of the items from each memory that they had provided on 
Day 1. There were two sessions in the recall task, each containing twenty trials. 
For each trial, participants were first required to retrieve the complete memory, 
followed by focussing their attention on specific items related to the memory. 
During memory retrieval, participants were instructed to reconstruct the 
scenario as closely as possible to the real situation when the event originally 
happened. They were encouraged to bring visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and 
any other details into the reconstructed scenario. For instance, the beds, carpet, 
light, drawer and any other furniture in the bedroom, the setting of furniture, the 
sensation of holding the diary, the feeling of reading the diary, the sister’s 
handwriting, the sister’s footsteps and all the other details in the memory 
“Stealing my sister’s diary” should be reconstructed. While recalling and 
evaluating an item, attention should be focused on that item only. Specifically, 
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participants were instructed to evaluate how much they liked this item and how 
vividly they recalled it. 
Each trial consisted of the following sequence of stimuli: (1) a centrally 
presented fixation cross for 0.5 sec, (2) a title for memory retrieval, whose 
duration was randomly chosen between 6 to 10 seconds (jittered, based on a 
uniform distribution), (3) a blank screen for 0.5 sec, (4) an item’s name for 
evaluation (item1) from the memory, presented for four sec, (5) ‘how much did 
you like item1?’ presented until a response was made (participants answered 
rating questions on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 4 (liked it very much) by pressing a 
button box with their right hands), (6) ‘how vivid is item1 now?’ presented until a 
response was made, (7) a blank screen for 2 to 4 sec (uniform distribution), 
steps (4)-(7) were repeated for the other three items from the event (i.e. item2, 
item3 and item4). The order of the presence of liked and disliked items was 
randomised across trials. A practice trial was carried out outside the scanner 
before participants went into the scanner. 
Note that I asked participants to rate how much they liked the item during the 
event. However, in case their evaluation was influenced by their general liking 
for that type of item during daily life, after scanning I also asked them to give a 
rating of each item type used in the experiment (i.e., rating in general). For 
instance, if a participant had included book items, regardless of whether it was a 
statistics textbook, a science fiction novel, or a romance novel; they rated how 
much they liked books in daily life. In Experiment 2, the subjective values of 
items in imagery were calculated by subtracting everyday values from imagined 
values. However, in Experiment3, participants did not rate each single item’s 
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everyday value. Instead, they provided the rating of each item type used in the 
experiment. The reason we did not ask for the everyday value of each item was 
that some items only appeared once in participants’ life and there is no such 
‘everyday value’ for this type of items. 
4.4. fMRI Data Acquisition and Preprocessing 
Functional imaging was performed on a 3T scanner (Siemens TIM Trio) during 
the autobiographical memory and item recall task. The functional data were 
acquired with a gradient-echo EPI sequence (TR, 3.36s; TE, 30ms; flip angle, 
90°; resolution, 3×3×3 mm; 64×74; 48 slices per volume). The total number of 
volumes in each run varied across participants because of the variation of 
response time for each rating (the mean number of volumes was 329 per 
session, range = 248-468). A high-resolution T1-weighted 3-D structural image 
(1 mm3) was acquired after two sessions of functional scans. A double-echo 
FLASH fieldmap sequence was also recorded. 
Functional images were processed and analysed with SPM8 (Wellcome Trust 
Centre for Neuroimaging, London UK, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). The first five volumes of each 
scan were discarded for T1 equilibration. Preprocessing procedures included 
bias correction, realignment, unwarping, coregistration, slice timing correction, 
and normalization to the MNI template using the Dartel toolbox. EPI images 
were smoothed with an isotropic 8mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
4.4.1. Main Analysis 
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The preprocessed functional images were analysed with general lineal models 
(GLMs). Along with regressors of interest, each GLM included 6 movement 
regressors for each session, estimated during realignment, as well as two 
further regressors modelling each session. Based on our strong a priori 
hypothesis that mPFC activity is modulated by the subjective value of memory 
content, we performed small-volume correction (SVC) within an anatomical 
mask of bilateral mPFC (volume ~ 53,493 mm3). This mask was derived from 
the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), as implemented in the WFU 
PickAtlas Tool (Maldjian et al., 2003). Within this small volume we report effects 
that survive p<.05 family-wise error correction (FWE). 
GLM1 was used for testing the hypothesis that mPFC represents value in 
autobiographical memory. According to our hypothesis, activity when recalling 
and evaluating liked items should be higher compared to recalling and 
evaluating disliked items. This model included five regressors per session: (1) 
recalling a memory, (2) evaluating a liked item from the memory (regardless of 
the item’s subjective rating; 2 items per memory), (3) evaluating a disliked item 
from the memory (regardless of the item’s subjective rating; 2 items per 
memory), (4) ITI periods and (5) key-presses. Trial periods were modelled with 
a boxcar function for the entire length of each period, convolved with the 
canonical HRF. Parameter estimates for regressors (1) to (3) were averaged 
across the two sessions and entered into a second-level model. The contrast 
between recalling a memory and evaluating an item (regardless of whether liked 
or disliked) was used to make sure participants were engaged in the AM recall 
99 
 
task during scanning. We also compared the activity in mPFC when recalling a 
liked item versus recalling a disliked item. 
GLM2 was used to further investigate the nature of the activity in mPFC found 
in GLM1 for liked versus disliked items, to see whether mPFC activity showed a 
parametric relationship to the subjective ratings of value given for each item. 
GLM2 included five regressors per session: (1) recalling a memory, (2) 
evaluating an item from the memory (regardless of liked/disliked), (3) a 
parametric modulator of the item regressor based on the participant’s value of 
that item (i.e., how much did they like this item within the event; a rating from 1-
4), (4) ITI periods and (5) key-presses. A one-sample t-test was carried out in 
the 2nd level analysis to test the effect of parametric modulator (regressor 3) 
averaged across the two sessions. Therefore, whereas GLM1 interrogates 
BOLD response for liked vs. disliked items (irrespective of their individual 
subjective rating in the scanner), GLM2 interrogates whether BOLD linearly 
varies with the individual subjective ratings of each item (irrespective of whether 
they are liked/disliked). 
4.4.2. Further analyses of vmPFC activity 
We found significantly increased activity in vmPFC in GLM1 and GLM2 for 
objects with higher subjective value. However, we also found weak but 
significant correlations between the ratings of item value, and ratings of item 
recall vividness and of the item’s familiarity at the time of the event (see 
Results). Thus, these two factors might contribute to our observed item value 
effect. To investigate further, we also evaluated GLM3 within the vmPFC (an 
anatomical mask of bilateral vmPFC was derived from the AAL atlas, the 
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volume ~ 15,513 mm3), which included 7 regressors, five of them were the 
same from those in GLM2, plus another two parametric modulators (PMs) – 
based on the recall vividness ratings and familiarity ratings of each item – in the 
following order: (1) recalling a memory, (2) evaluating an item, (3) vividness PM 
of regressor 2, (4) familiarity PM of regressor 2, (5) item value PM of regressor 
2, (6) ITI, and (7) key-presses. Parameter estimates for regressor5 were 
averaged across the two sessions and entered into a second-level model (a 
one-sample t-test). In SPM, the first PM is allowed to explain both unique and 
shared variance, with subsequent PMs explaining the remaining unexplained 
variance of the preceding PMs. Thus, any value effects found in GLM3 is 
variance uniquely explained by the item value PM after removing shared 
variance from the preceding familiarity and vividness PMs. 
Similarly, to assess any effects of item familiarity or item recall vividness 
independently from the other factor and from item value, we evaluated GLM4 
and GLM5 with the PMs from GLM3 re-ordered so that familiarity and vividness 
came last respectively. Regressors in GLM4 were (1) recalling a memory, (2) 
evaluating an item, (3) vividness PM of regressor 2, (4) item value PM of 
regressor 2, (5) familiarity PM of regressor 2, (6) ITI, and (7) key-presses. 
Regressors in GLM5 were (1) recalling a memory, (2) evaluating an item, (3) 
familiarity PM of regressor 2, (4) item value PM of regressor 2, (5) vividness PM 
of regressor 2, (6) ITI, and (7) key-presses. Finally, to examine whether the 
event-specific item value effects we observed in GLM1 and 2 could reflect the 
values in everyday life of the types of item retrieved, we built GLM6. All the 
regressors and PMs in GLM6 were identical as those in GLM3 except that the 
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last PM was the general value rating for that type of item in daily life. GLM6 was 
meant to detect any general preferences for different types of item that might 
modulate vmPFC activity. However, we note that this analysis of general 
preferences differs in nature from the analysis of the values of specific items. 
To investigate the relation of the event-specific item value effects seen in 
vmPFC during the item evaluation phase to activity during retrieval of the 
corresponding autobiographical memory, we used additional GLMs for each of 
the ratings given to characterise the AMs in the initial meeting. Each GLM 
contained five regressors: (1) recalling a memory, (2) one of the memory rating 
PM of regressor 1, (3) evaluating an item, (4) ITI, and (5) key-presses. The PM 
regressor was one of the seven memory ratings, i.e. memory pleasantness, 
personal significance, recall frequency, recall difficulty, emotional intensity, 
recall detail, and memory age. Parameter estimates for regressor 2 were 
averaged across the two sessions and the percentage signal change in a 10-
mm-radius region of interest (ROI) in vmPFC centred on the peak item rating 
effect in GLM3 (-6, +33, -12) was extracted by using MarsBaR toolbox(Brett, 
Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002). A one-sample t-test was carried out for 
each GLM to test if there was any modulation of vmPFC ROI activity by one of 
the memory ratings when recalling memories. 
4.5. Behavioural Results 
4.5.1. Memory 
The memory age ranged from one day to 31 years old. Table 3 shows the 
distribution of different memory ratings across all participants. Correlation 
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coefficients between any two ratings are also present in Table 4. To calculate 
correlation coefficients between memory ratings at the group level, I first 
acquired correlation coefficients for each participant. Then I ran a one sample t-
test to test if the mean correlation coefficient of the entire group is statistically 
different from zero. It shows that significant correlations exist between several 
memory ratings. Correlation coefficients which survive the Bonferroni correction 
are listed as below: pleasantness* detail, pleasantness* significance, 
pleasantness* recall frequency, detail* significance, detail* recall frequency, 
detail* recall difficulty, detail* memory age, emotional intensity* significance, 
emotional intensity* recall frequency, significance* recall frequency, recall 
frequency* recall difficulty, and recall difficulty* memory age. 
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Table 3 The results of memory ratings 
 1 2 3 4 Mean 
How much did you like this event? 
(1 not at all-4 very much) 17% 18% 31% 33% 2.81 
Level of detail? 
(1 vague-4 vivid) 11% 31% 36% 22% 2.69 
Emotional intensity evoked by the 
memory? 
(1 non-emotional-4 highly-emotional) 17% 38% 31% 14% 2.41 
Personal significance of this 
memory? 
(1 insignificance-4 life-changing) 27% 36% 27% 10% 2.20 
How often do you recall this 
memory? 
(1 never-4 very often) 34% 45% 18% 4% 1.92 
Difficulty of recall? 
(1 very easy-4 very difficult) 36% 42% 17% 5% 1.91 
 
104 
 
Table 4 Mean Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients (rho) and standard 
deviation (in parentheses) between memory ratings. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) 
pleasantness 
-       
(2) detail 
 
0.255*** 
(0.22) 
-      
(3) emotional 
intensity 
0.149** 
(0.26) 
0.312 
(0.24) 
-     
(4) 
significance 
0.195*** 
(0.23) 
0.268*** 
(0.23) 
0.602*** 
(0.17) 
-    
(5) recall 
frequency 
0.143*** 
(0.19) 
0.406*** 
(0.23) 
0.371*** 
(0.21) 
0.423*** 
(0.18) 
-   
(6) recall 
difficulty 
-0.049 
(0.17) 
-0.491*** 
(0.24) 
-0.139** 
(0.22) 
-0.159** 
(0.21) 
-0.369*** 
(0.19) 
-  
(7) memory 
age 
-0.059 
(0.17) 
-0.422*** 
(0.26) 
0.064 
(0.18) 
0.102* 
(0.21) 
-0.115* 
(0.22) 
-0.407*** 
(0.21) 
- 
*significant correlation at p< .05 
**significant correlation at p< .01 
***significant correlation at p< .001 
The Bonferroni corrected threshold is 0.002 (0.05/21). 
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Figure 17. Percentage of liked and disliked items across ratings 1-4 on Day2. 
(a) Ratings for the specific items within an event that were initially identified as ‘liked’ or 
‘disliked’ on Day1, showing higher ratings for the ‘liked’ items. (b) Ratings of 
participants’ preferences for these types of items in daily life, showing no differences 
between the categories of items from which the ‘liked’ or ‘disliked’ examples came. (c) 
Recall vividness for ‘liked’ and ‘disliked’ items within an event. (d) Familiarity rating of 
items (at the time of the event). Liked items were rated as more vividly recalled and 
more familiar at the time of the event than disliked items. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
4.5.2. Items 
Only two liked and two disliked items from each memory were used in the 
scanning period on Day 2. Although some items appeared more than once 
across each participant’s reported memories, the influence of repetition should 
be negligible because the number of items was small (mean number of 
repeated items out of 160 used for each participant = 2.99, SD= 4.22). A two-
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way repeated measures ANOVA on rating of items was conducted to verify the 
value differences between liked and disliked items, including factors of event-
specificity (i.e. value of that specific item within the event versus value of that 
type of item in general life) and item type (liked versus disliked). There were 
main effects of both rating specificity (F(1, 24) = 6.08, p = .021) and item type 
(F(1, 24) = 66.82, p< .001) and the interaction between them (F(1, 24) = 140.88, 
p< .001). Further analyses showed that ‘liked’ items had higher event-specific 
value ratings (t(24) = 13.17, p< .001) but not higher general value ratings (t(1, 
24) < 1, p = .915). This suggests that the item value ratings in the scanner and 
the liked/disliked categorization prior to scanning do indeed reflect the event-
specific value of the items concerned, not just the general values of these types 
of items in other circumstances. A paired-samples t-test on recall vividness 
between liked and disliked items revealed that liked items were more vivid than 
disliked items, t(24) = 10.85, p< .001. Figure 17 illustrates the value and recall 
vividness rating of items on Day 2. 
Correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rank coefficient) between vividness rating 
and rating within events are listed in Table 5, as well as those between the 
familiarity rating and rating within events. In general, items with higher values 
tended to have both higher familiarity and vividness ratings. 
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Table 5 Mean Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients (rho) between item 
ratings. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
(1)rating within event - 
  
(2)recall vividness 0.238*** - 
 
(3)familiarity 0.151*** 0.221*** - 
***significant correlation at p< .001 
4.6. fMRI Results 
4.6.1. Autobiographical memory recall 
We first searched for regions that showed a greater BOLD response when 
recalling a memory relative to evaluating an individual item (irrespective of 
liked/disliked) in GLM1, showing large regions of activity (p<0.05, whole brain 
FWE) throughout the network that has consistently been associated with 
autobiographical memory recall, including mPFC, medial temporal lobes, 
retrosplenial and medial parietal areas (Maguire, 2001; Svoboda et al., 2006) 
(Table 6; Figure 18). 
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Table 6 Results of the contrast comparing autobiographical memory recall to 
item recall 
Region 
Cluster 
Size 
x y z 
Peak Peak p 
T (FWE-corr) 
ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex 
1660 6 42 -9 10.73 
< .001 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44 -30 33 -9 7.46 < .001 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 103 24 30 39 7.15 < .001 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 35 48 30 9 6.81 < .001 
Sub-Gyral 169 -21 27 39 8.98 < .001 
Superior Temporal Pole 12 42 24 -24 5.22 0.016 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 12 51 12 -9 5.83 0.002 
Superior Temporal Gyrus 383 42 -54 21 9.02 < .001 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 69 -54 -54 -6 6.26 < .001 
Posterior Cingulate 4024 -9 -57 24 11.40 < .001 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 296 -42 -69 24 9.33 < .001 
Cerebellum 18 12 -45 -42 6.49 < .001 
Cerebellar Tonsil 16 -9 -48 -45 5.55 0.005 
 
 
Figure 18. Autobiographical memory recall versus item memory. 
Plots shown at p<0.005 FWE corrected, cluster size> 1000 voxels. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 19. Item value effects. 
(a) The Liked- Disliked item contrast. (b) Parametric effect of subjective rating of value 
within event. Plots shown at p< 0.05 FWE, small volume corrected (SVC) using the 
anatomical mask of mPFC. The lower panels of (a) and (b) depict the mask.. 
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4.6.2. Subjective value of items in mPFC 
To test our specific hypothesis, we first compared the evaluation of liked items 
to the evaluation of disliked items in GLM1 (liked > disliked). This contrast 
showed significantly greater activity in vmPFC (-12, +33, -12, Z = 4.23; p = .003 
FWE SVC; 
 
Figure 19). Furthermore, the parametric modulator of likability rating within 
event in GLM2 also revealed an effect in a similar area of vmPFC (-6, +33, -12, 
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Z = 4.02; p=.008 FWE SVC, 
 
Figure 19). In summary, we provide evidence that vmPFC shows greater 
activity for liked items and its activity positively correlates with the values of 
individual items from recalled autobiographical memories. 
4.6.3. Relation of vmPFC value effects to familiarity and vividness 
We found significantly increased activity in vmPFC in GLM1 and GLM2 for 
items with higher subjective value, consistent with our hypothesis. However, we 
also found weak but significant correlations between the ratings of item value, 
item recall vividness and the familiarity of the item at the time of the event (the 
latter from the initial interview), see Table 5. Thus, it is possible that these two 
factors might contribute to our observed item value effect in vmPFC. 
Accordingly, we examined vmPFC activity in more detail by including parametric 
modulators for item value, vividness and familiarity, rotating the order of 
parametric modulators across analyses (see Methods), and testing for 
significance within the mPFC mask. There was no significant effect of mPFC 
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mask. For an exploratory purpose, we ran a follow-up analysis again but used a 
mask focused on vmPFC using an SVC for this region. The value effect seen in 
vmPFC remained significant when familiarity and vividness were both included 
as parametric modulators in GLM3 (-6, +33, -12, Z = 3.58; p=.034 FWE SVC). 
These results support our hypothesis that vmPFC activity was modulated by the 
values of items in AMs, and that this effect cannot be fully explained by the 
familiarity of the item at the time of the event, or by the vividness of its 
recollection. However, there is a caveat: there might be the issue of ‘double 
dipping’ regarding using the vmPFC mask in this analysis. 
According to Benoit et al. (2014), the same region within vmPFC represents 
both value and familiarity of an item. Therefore, an anatomical mask focused on 
vmPFC was used in GLM4 to test if there was familiarity effect within vmPFC in 
this experiment. The parametric modulator of item familiarity within event 
(GLM4) also revealed a significant unique effect in the vmPFC (-12, 42, -9, Z = 
3.55; p=.043 FWE SVC; Figure 20), which was not caused by the value or 
vividness of the items. This is in line with the account that vmPFC integrates 
affective value and familiarity of AM contents (Benoit et al., 2014). However, 
there was no unique effect of recall vividness within vmPFC (p> .05, Z = 2.83 
FWE SVC) in GLM5, which suggests that the vividness of an item’s recall does 
not explain vmPFC activity beyond that explained by item familiarity or item 
value. 
The involvement of vmPFC in value representation is well-known in decision-
making tasks. However, there was no significant effect of the general every-day 
value of the types of items retrieved within vmPFC (GLM6). This suggests that 
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the item value effect we observed in the present study reflected the memory-
specific value of the item, rather than general preferences for different types of 
item. In sum, GLMs 3-6 suggest that, in our AM-focussed task, vmPFC 
independently tracks both the value and familiarity of the items within an event 
that is remembered in an autobiographical memory, rather than the non-specific 
values of these types of items in general. 
 
Figure 20. Effects of item familiarity. 
Effects of the familiarity of the item at the time of the event (a), Plots shown at p<0.05 
FWE, SVC on the vmPFC mask in (b). 
4.6.4. Relation of vmPFC item value effects to the personal 
emotional significance of the memory 
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How might the subjective value of the items within an AM relate to processing 
during recall of the AM itself? The behavioural results show that there were 
significant correlations between the summed values of the items present in an 
AM and several of the ratings used to characterise that AM overall, including 
memory pleasantness, personal significance, recall frequency, recall difficulty, 
emotional intensity, recall detail, and memory age. We tested how activity in the 
vmPFC region showing the item value effect varied with these memory ratings 
during retrieval of the AM itself, using a separate GLM for each memory rating 
(see Methods). During recall of an AM, the mean activity in the vmPFC ROI 
varied with both the personal significance of the memory (p= 0.038) and the 
emotional intensity evoked by the AM (p= 0.0435). None of the other memory 
ratings showed significant modulation of vmPFC activity during recall of an AM. 
It is likely that the subjective value of the items contribute to the personal 
emotional significance of the memories they occupy. This would explain the 
common response in this region to item value and to emotional intensity and 
personal significance. Example items include a birthday cake made by mom, a 
ticket to a favourite singer's concert, a seashell collected from the beach during 
a family trip, rocks from grandfather's collection, and a postcard from childhood 
friends. 
4.7. Discussion 
Participants in an fMRI scanner recalled personal autobiographical memories 
(AMs), and evaluated their liking for specific items within each remembered 
event. Half of the items used were identified as ‘liked’ and the other half as 
‘disliked’ within the context of each AM. Compared to ‘disliked’ items, the ‘liked’ 
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items (in a specific event) were reported as being more familiar at the time of 
the event, and were recalled more vividly during memory recall. Consistent with 
the hypothesis that mPFC represents the value of items within AMs, vmPFC 
activity while recalling and evaluating items was modulated by how much 
participants liked those items at the time when the events happened. 
During recall of the entire AM, activity in the vmPFC location showing the item 
value effect was modulated by the personal significance and the emotional 
intensity of the memory. This finding is in line with the ideas that vmPFC plays a 
role in the generation of affective meaning (Roy et al., 2012), in the association 
of events with emotional responses (Euston et al., 2012), and in the modulation 
of emotional response via self-relevance (Sperduti et al., 2016). It is well 
recognised that the vmPFC is involved in self-relevant processing during 
autobiographical memory recall (e.g., Moore III et al., 2014; Summerfield et al., 
2009). Consistent with the hypothesis by D’Argembeau that vmPFC assigns 
personal value to self-related information (D’Argembeau, 2013), our results 
suggest that one of its roles is to provide the subjective values of the items 
present in AMs, and that these values contribute to the overall personal 
emotional significance of the AM itself. 
In Experiment 2, the activity of a region in mPFC (peak voxel coordinates: +9, 
+57, +12) was modulated by the subjective value of common everyday items 
that participants were imagining in novel scenarios. This region was more 
dorsal and anterior than the item value-related region in the present study (-6, 
+33, -12). A functional gradient along dorsal-ventral axis has been observed in 
mPFC, between making self- or other-related judgements, such that self-
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relevant information is believed to be processed in more ventral mPFC, 
whereas other-relevant information is processed in more dorsal mPFC (Denny 
et al., 2012; Nicolle et al., 2012; Sul et al., 2015). Similarly, vmPFC activity 
during memory for recent presentation of face stimuli is greater for personally 
relevant faces (Trinkler, King, Doeller, Rugg, & Burgess, 2009). Thus the more 
ventral location of the item value effect here, compared to Experiment 2, may 
reflect the greater personal emotional relevance of the items from participants’ 
autobiographical memories compared to the photos of common everyday 
objects used in the Experiment 2. 
Speer et al. (2014) discovered that mPFC activity was greater during the recall 
of AMs that made them feel happy compared to the recall of neutral memories, 
using a similar paradigm to our own. In their study, ventral striatum activity was 
also parametrically modulated by affective ratings of the memories. Both ventral 
striatum and mPFC also responded to monetary reward in their study, and 
participants were even willing to lose monetary reward to obtain chances to 
recall positive memories. Speer et al. (2014) suggested that positive memory 
recall is valuable, so that the reward system was recruited in positive memory 
recall. Compared to Speer et al. (2014), our study indicates that vmPFC can 
represent the values of different memory components separately, i.e., the items 
within memories. We also noticed that, during recall of an AM, vmPFC activity 
was modulated by the personal significance and emotional intensity of the AM, 
implying that the variation in vmPFC activity with the subjective value of items 
relates to the part those items play in the emotional self-relevance of the event. 
If the value-related vmPFC effect in our study reflects items’ personal emotional 
117 
 
relevance, this might explain the reduced involvement of ventral striatum (+12, 
+3, -3, p = 0.25) here compared to Speer et al. (2014), assuming that ventral 
striatal activity reflects the subjective consequences of recalling a positive 
memory (i.e. the feeling of happiness) which has direct value for the current 
state (equivalent to  receiving money), consistent with its association with 
reward magnitude more generally (D’Argembeau, Xue, Lu, Van der Linden, & 
Bechara, 2008; Diekhof, Kaps, Falkai, & Gruber, 2012; B Knutson, Adams, 
Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Stott & Redish, 2014; Strait, Sleezer, & Hayden, 2015). 
In addition to subjective value, greater levels of activity in vmPFC have also 
been reported when participants recalled a familiar memory or imagined 
personal future events within a familiar contextual setting, compared to 
imagining personal future events within an unfamiliar contextual setting (Benoit 
et al., 2014; Szpunar et al., 2009). Consistent with the results from these 
studies, vmPFC activity was also modulated by how familiar the items were at 
the time of the AM in our study, being greater when recalling and evaluating 
more familiar items. However, the unique effects of item value and item 
familiarity occur independently in vmPFC, and there were no significant 
correlation between a memory’s personal significance or emotional intensity 
and the summed familiarity of the items within it. Further studies are necessary 
to clarify the nature and importance of item familiarity in modulating vmPFC 
activity. 
In summary, we showed that vmPFC activity is modulated by the values of 
items within autobiographical memories. Taken together with Experiment 2, 
these results are consistent with the hypothesis that mPFC represents the 
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values of elements within autobiographical memory and mental imagery, with 
the more ventral mPFC location found in the present study reflecting the greater 
emotional self-relevance of objects in autobiographical memories than those in 
arbitrary imagined scenarios. In addition, our findings support the association of 
vmPFC activity with processing of self-relevance and, in our study, with the 
contribution of liked objects to the personal emotional relevance of 
autobiographical memories.  
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Chapter 5. General Discussion 
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5.1. Overview 
In this final chapter, I will discuss the similarities and dissimilarities between the 
two fMRI experiments. Afterwards, I will discuss a few issues which are highly 
relevant to value representation and/or function of the mPFC. 
The motivation of this study was to investigate whether the common function of 
mPFC in episodic simulation and autobiographical memory retrieval is 
subjective value representation. More specifically, the aim of my thesis was 
mainly to answer two research questions: 
1. Does the mPFC represent subjective values of imagined components 
during mental imagery? 
2. Does the mPFC represent subjective values of elements during retrieval of 
autobiographical memory? 
Experiment 1 was carried out to verify that the imagined-value paradigm is able 
to manipulate subjective values through mental imagination. Two fMRI studies, 
Experiment 2 and 3, were carried to answer each research question. 
Experiment 2 revealed that there was a positive correlation between the 
subjective values of imagined objects and the BOLD signals of mPFC, which 
implies that mPFC was involved in episodic imagination of subjective value 
representations. The possibility that the mPFC effect was modulated by 
participants’ general preferences had been ruled out since the subjective rating 
was obtained by subtracting everyday value from imagined value. In other 
words, the effect was modulated by imagery-specific values rather than 
everyday values. Results of Experiment 3 show that there were also 
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parametrical relationships between values of items in autobiographical memory 
and vmPFC activity. In the meantime, the vmPFC activity was also modulated 
by the personal significances and emotional intensities of recalled memory. 
However, the vmPFC activity was not modulated by the every-day values of 
items which suggests that the vmPFC effect in Experiment 3 was memory-
specific. Taken together, findings in both Experiment 2 and 3 were not merely 
memory-independent or imagery-independent value representations. In short, 
these results support the hypothesis that mPFC represents subjective values of 
elements in autobiographical memory and episodic simulation. 
5.2. Differences between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 shows that the mPFC activity was modulated by the subjective 
value of elements in the imagined scenarios and Experiment 3 shows that the 
vmPFC activity was modulated by the memory-dependent value, personal 
significance and emotional intensity of the contents of autobiographical 
memories. However, please bear in mind that the effect of the subjective value 
of items in mPFC was not based on the corrected subjective value, but based 
on the value within the events. Although there was no significant effect within 
mPFC for everyday value, it does not necessary guarantee that the mPFC 
effect we found from GLM2 could not be influenced by everyday value at all 
(Henson, 2005). 
Both of them support the hypothesis that mPFC plays the role of value 
representation in autobiographical memory and mental simulation. 
Nevertheless, there are still differences between the results from these two 
experiments. 
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The main difference is that the effect in Experiment 3 was in a more ventral and 
posterior region within mPFC, compared to the one in Experiment 2. This could 
be explained by one or some of the following explanations. Functional 
segregation along dorsal-ventral axis has been observed in mPFC. When 
making self- or others-related judgements, mPFC is one of the brain areas 
involved. Within the mPFC, self-relevant information is believed to be processed 
in the more ventral part while others-relevant information is believed to be 
processed in the more dorsal part (for a review, see Denny et al., 2012), with 
gradual self-other representational changes along the ventral-dorsal axis 
(Nicolle et al., 2012; Sul et al., 2015; Van Overwalle, 2009). Similarly, vmPFC 
activity during memory for a recent presentation of face stimuli is greater for 
personally relevant faces (Trinkler, King, Doeller, Rugg, & Burgess, 2009). This 
could explain why the item value effect in Experiment 3 was more ventral than 
that in Experiment 2. The items in Experiment 3 were taken from participants’ 
autobiographical memories and were, therefore, self-relevant to some degree, 
whereas the items in Experiment 2 were photos of arbitrary common objects. 
In parallel to this argument, functional segregation along the mPFC anterior-
posterior axis is a potential explanation for why the value representation in 
autobiographical memory recall was more posterior than that in mental imagery. 
Researchers suggest that representations of complex, secondary, abstract or 
intangible stimuli are located in the anterior mPFC while representations of 
simple, primary, or tangible stimuli locate in the posterior mPFC (for reviews, 
see Amodio & Frith, 2006; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004). This hypothesis is not 
only supported by the anatomical fact that the anterior mPFC is more recently 
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developed than the posterior mPFC (Ö ngür and Price, 2000), but also 
supported by experimental results (Sescousse, Caldú, Segura, & Dreher, 2013; 
Sescousse, Redouté, & Dreher, 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014). 
For example, Sescousse and colleagues found a dissociation in the mPFC 
depending on reward types (Sescousse et al., 2010). A posterior mPFC region 
responded to primary reward (i.e. erotic pictures) and an anterior mPFC region 
responded to secondary reward (i.e. monetary reward). Wang et al. (2014) 
showed that the values of immediate rewards were represented in a more 
posterior region of mPFC while the values of delayed rewards were represented 
in a more anterior region of mPFC. In another study, Koritzky et al (2013) also 
demonstrated that information with higher immediate effect engaged more 
posterior mPFC. Compared to mental imagery, the contents of autobiographical 
memory are less abstract and have lower uncertainty, therefore, this difference 
might explain why the value representations in Experiment 3 were more 
posterior than that in Experiment 2. 
In this section, I tried to explain why the proposed common role of subjective 
value representation did not recruit the same region within mPFC in the two 
different tasks of autobiographical memory recall and episodic imagery. The first 
argument argues that these two tasks involve different degrees of self-related 
components. This would support the existence of an anatomical gradient 
concerning the extent to which self-relevance contributes to the valuation of an 
item. The second one argues that the anatomical location of value 
representation for different types of items varies. These two arguments are not 
mutually exclusive. It is possible that both of them contribute to the differences 
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in the location of activity between two experiments. One can imagine that self-
relevance could modulate value in several ways, e.g., multiply the basic value 
by the importance of the item to oneself, or contribut to the valuation itself due 
to the intrinsic emotional importance of the item conferred by memories of 
previous experiences with it. 
Further experiments are necessary to refine this interpretation. For example, it 
would be nice to recruit participants to imagine items from their memory 
appearing in a novel and fictitious situation. Researchers would then have the 
chance to compare the value representations of the same item in different 
situations. 
5.3. General Perspectives 
In this section, I will discuss some topics which I believe are highly relevant to 
the aim of my thesis. Since this thesis focuses on value representation and the 
function of mPFC, I will start from discussing the valuation system. I will then 
explore two relevant topics, social valuation and self-concept representation, 
both of which have been associated with processing in vmPFC. I will also briefly 
describe the impairments in memory resulting from vmPFC lesions and link 
these to the hypothesis of my thesis. Finally, I would close by discussing some 
clinical applications of imagery training on mental diseases and some potential 
therapeutic strategies inspired by the results of my experiments on mental 
diseases and memory deficits. 
5.3.1. Automatic valuation system 
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An automatic ‘Brain Valuation System’ has been proposed to include posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), hippocampus, ventral striatum and vmPFC. This system 
is modulated by preferences even when participants were engaging in a 
preference-irrelevant task, which implies that this valuation system is an 
automatic system (Lebreton et al., 2009; Kim 2007). The activation in the mPFC 
when participants were passive viewing different goods (e.g., books, CDs, 
lotteries) was able to predict their preferences between two different goods in 
an independent task (Levy & Glimcher, 2011). In other words, the valuation 
system is still working under circumstances when no decision has to be made. 
In Experiment 3, the value and familiarity of items were rated based on the 
value and familiarity at the time when those events happened. These ratings 
must be different from the current value and familiarity ratings of items. But the 
vmPFC was modulated by the ratings then, rather than by the ratings now. One 
potential explanation is that during item retrieval and evaluation, the valuation 
system automatically activated and began evaluating items in participants’ 
recall. But this cannot explain why the other parts of the valuation system (i.e., 
PCC, hippocampus, and ventral striatum) did not show the same pattern as 
vmPFC did. An alternative explanation is that the values of items were encoded 
when the event happened and the values were retrieved during memory recall. 
Studies have shown that brain regions activated during encoding a memory 
also reactivated during retrieving the same memory (see Danker & Anderson, 
2010 for a review). Regions included primary sensory cortices (Stock, Röder, 
Burke, Bien, & Rösler, 2008; Wheeler & Buckner, 2003; Wing, Ritchey, & 
Cabeza, 2014), emotional processing areas (Smith, Henson, Dolan, & Rugg, 
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2004), and encoding strategic processing regions (Nyberg et al., 2001). The 
vmPFC effect in Experiment 3 implies that the values of items are part of the 
memory reinstatement process. 
5.3.2. vmPFC and social valuation 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the mPFC has been seen as the centre for common 
value representation because values of items from different categories have 
been found to be represented in mPFC. The attributes of these items were 
highly divergent, from commercial reward such as food, trinket and money to 
those uncommercial or abstract ones such as charitable donations (Hare et al., 
2010), people (Cunningham, Johnsen, & Waggoner, 2011), to win or lose in 
bids (van den Bos, Talwar, & McClure, 2013), attractive faces (Smith, Clithero, 
Boltuck, & Huettel, 2014), social appraisal (Lin, Adolphs, & Rangel, 2011), in-
group membership (Morrison, Decety, & Molenberghs, 2012), closeness of 
relationship and trustworthiness of partner (Fareri, Chang, & Delgado, 2015), 
etc. (for a review, see Ruff & Fehr, 2014). The values of these rewards are built 
upon social norms or experiences of social interaction and social learning. For 
example, in a 150-trial charitable donation fMRI experiment (Hare et al., 2010), 
participants were allowed to decide how much money ($x) they would like to 
donate to a charity organisation (x ranged from 0 to 100) in each single trial and 
they were also told that they would receive $(100- x) afterwards. Only one of the 
150 trials (randomly decided) became the implemented trial. The subjective 
value of charitable donation was defined by combing both the deservingness 
rating of a charity and the amount of money participant would like to donate to 
that charity. The fMRI results showed that BOLD signal in vmPFC was the only 
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region which showed a positive correlation with the subjective value of 
charitable donations during decision-making phase (i.e., when deciding how 
much you would like to donate?). In another recent study, participants were 
shown faces of others along with positive or negative comments (e.g., ‘you are 
kind’, ‘you are unreliable’) while they were in the fMRI scanner. The BOLD 
signal in vmPFC was higher when receiving positive comments than receiving 
negative ones (Kawasaki et al., 2016). In general, this evidence supports the 
idea that vmPFC is critical to abstract and social value representation. 
If vmPFC is involved in social valuation and social decision-making, it is 
reasonable to assume that brain regions which are commonly been found in 
social cognition also collaborate with vmPFC, for instances, the temporal-
parietal junction (TPJ) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Some sub-regions of TPJ 
has been found to be involved in theory of mind as the function of reasoning 
other people’s minds (e.g., Mars et al., 2012; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) (for 
reviews, see Saxe, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009). In the meanwhile, the IFG has 
been found to be critical in emotional empathy or affective empathy (Hooker, 
Verosky, Germine, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2010; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, 
& Perry, 2009). Indeed, studies have shown that the functional connectivity 
between vmPFC and TPJ or between vmPFC and IFG were greater while 
participants were engaged in social decision-makings compared to while they 
were engaged in non-social tasks (Hare et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2014). 
How about social tasks without decision-making or value evaluation? Do these 
tasks involve vmPFC? If the valuation system is automatic, then the vmPFC 
should be involved in most social tasks even those one without intentional 
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valuation. There are plenty supporting evidence from neuroimaging and 
neuropsychological studies showing that the vmPFC is involved in different 
social tasks (for a review, see Bzdok et al., 2013). Figure 5 illustrates some of 
these functions, including emotional empathy, theory of mind, personal traits 
inference and so on (for reviews, see Saxe, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009; Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009), although some studies found a dmPFC region for 
theory of mind (e.g., Zerubavel, Bearman, Weber, & Ochsner, 2015). Taken 
together, the involvement of vmPFC in social valuation and social cognition 
tasks imply that the function of vmPFC is related to subjective value processing 
or representation. This is in line with the main hypothesis of the present thesis- 
the mPFC represents the subjective value of components in our 
autobiographical memory and episodic imagination. 
5.3.3. Self-conception in mPFC? 
Is there a brain region or ‘centre’ responsible for the generation or processing of 
the concept of the self? One of the first groups of studies which attempted to 
answer this question used trait adjectives judgment task. In their highly cited 
paper, Kelley et al (2002) scanned participants while they were making trait 
judgements. In each trial, participants saw a trait adjective word and had to 
answer one of these questions, depending on the trial types: (1) Does the 
adjective ascribe you? (2) Does the adjective ascribe George W. Bush (i.e. an 
other) or (3) Is the adjective printed in uppercase? Compared to other-related 
judgements, mPFC had greater activity during self-judgement, which implies 
that mPFC is relevant to the processing of the self-concept. Further studies 
support this implication by showing greater mPFC activity during self-judgement 
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than other-judgement, including familiar famous people, unfamiliar friends, close 
friends or family members (D’Argembeau et al., 2012; Denny et al., 2012; 
Heatherton et al., 2006; S. C. Johnson et al., 2002; Joseph M. Moran, 
Heatherton, & Kelley, 2009; van der Meer et al., 2010; Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 
2007). However, there is another potential hypothesis which can also explain 
these results. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a large literature agrees that mPFC represents the 
values of elements in tasks with or without decision-makings and evaluations. In 
general, the self-concept is highly valued by most people across different 
cultures. Compared to the value attributed to others, the value attributed to the 
self is usually higher. Could this be the reason why the differences in self vs. 
others trait judgements appear to increase activity in mPFC (D’Argembeau, 
2011, 2013)? This account could be supported by results that participants 
valued their present selves higher than their selves in the past or future, and the 
mPFC activity pattern changed accordingly (D’Argembeau, Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Collette, Van der Linden, & Salmon, 2010). Furthermore, other studies 
also demonstrated that the activity differences in mPFC between self and close-
others (i.e., participant’s own mother) vary across participants from different 
cultures (Wuyun et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2007). One alternative explanation for 
this is that the mPFC does not represent the self-concept but just reflects the 
fact that we care about ourselves most (Gillihan & Farah, 2005), and then our 
close families and friends, and so on. 
The present thesis may provide some further insight towards resolving this 
disagreement. Experiment 3 shows that vmPFC activity was modulated by how 
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much participants liked each item, and how familiar each item was to them, 
while they were recalling and evaluating items. While recalling memories, the 
same region was also modulated by how personally significant each memory 
was and by how strong the emotional intensity evoked by each memory was, 
but not by how much participants liked each memory. If the involvement of 
mPFC in self-concept representation in the literature was only because of the 
high value of self-relevant components, then the vmPFC activity should also be 
correlated with the memory pleasantness in Experiment 3. This implies that the 
representation of self in mPFC may not merely reflect the high value of self-
relevant items but also because of involvement in processing of the self. 
Furthermore, the mPFC region represents item value within memory was more 
ventral than the region represents item value in imagery (i.e., Experiment 3 
versus Experiment 2). This result is in line with the argument that the ventral 
region involves more self-relevant processing or is more self-relevant than the 
dorsal region. 
5.3.4. Confabulation in vmPFC patient 
Based on the hypothesis that mPFC represent the subjective values of 
components in memory and imagination, what symptom would manifest if there 
is a partial or complete loss of this function? One possibility is that the 
subjective values of all items in a memory become the same and values of 
items across different memories also become equivalent. In this circumstance, 
people may become less able to differentiate one memory from another 
memory and they may misrecognise elements from one event to another event. 
An alternative possibility is that people may misattribute values to elements of 
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memories during autobiographical memory recall. In this situation, people may 
fail to retrieve critical elements of an event because the values of the elements 
they retrieved are low. Meanwhile, people may misrecognise one item from a 
different memory because they erroneously believe this item to have 
significantly high value. Whether which situation is true, it is reasonable to 
speculate that mPFC lesioned patients may have difficulty in retrieving details of 
autobiographical memories accurately. 
One of the most common memory deficit after vmPFC lesion (Figure 21) is 
confabulation (Turner, Cipolotti, & Shallice, 2010), especially spontaneous 
confabulation. Patients with confabulation provide false information 
unintentionally when they are requested to recall memories (Gilboa, 2006; 
Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Turner et al., 2010). Although there is no consensus 
on whether the confabulation would have the same or different amount of 
influence on semantic and episodic memory, one study shows that it has equal 
influence on both types of  memory (Moscovitch & Melo, 1997). 
 
Figure 21. Lesion of confabulating patietns 
Diagrams taken from Schnider (2003) shows lesion (shaded areas) overlap from 
different patients. 
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The underlying mechanism of confabulation is not yet clear but there are 
several hypotheses that try to explain it (for a review, see P. W. Burgess, 1996). 
One of these hypotheses is the temporality disturbance account (e.g., Barba, 
Cappelletti, Signorini, & Denes, 1997; Schacter, 1987; Williams & Rupp, 1938). 
This account suggests that confabulation is caused by disturbance of the 
temporal order of events. In other words, the contents of retrieved events by 
patients might be real but are retrieved with incorrect timestamps. However, 
there is growing evidence to imply that temporal order disturbance is not the 
only reason for confabulation (e.g., Gilboa, 2006; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; 
Thaiss & Petrides, 2008). Another theory proposes the idea that confabulation 
is due to failure of suppressing currently irrelevant events (Schnider & Ptak, 
1999; Schnider, Treyer, & Buck, 2000) (for a review, see Schnider, 2003). In a 
classical paradigm (e.g., Gilboa, Alain, He, Stuss, & Moscovitch, 2009; 
Schnider, 2000; Schnider & Ptak, 1999), pictures are presented to participants 
one by one and participants have to make a response when they detect a 
reappearance of the picture. The experiment consists of several runs and the 
same pictures are used across different runs, so that each picture appears 
more than once within the whole task. To perform this task well, participants 
have to be able to identify when the reappearance is within a single run or from 
previous runs. Specifically, target picture in the previous run are no longer 
relevant to the current run. Studies have shown that patients with confabulation 
have poor performance on this task- they mistook pictures appeared in earlier 
runs as if they appeared within the current run (Nahum, Ptak, Leemann, Lalive, 
& Schnider, 2010; Schnider & Ptak, 1999; see also Thaiss & Petrides, 2008; 
Turner et al., 2010). Studies have also shown that the engagement of vmPFC in 
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healthy controls was necessary for this task (Schnider et al., 2000). A relevant 
but more general hypothesis suggests that impaired source monitoring or reality 
monitoring is the main cause of confabulation rather than simply unable to 
suppress irrelevant information (M. K. Johnson, 1991; Turner et al., 2010). In a 
source monitoring task, participants had to judge whether an item was imagined 
by themselves or was read out loud by examiner earlier. Compared to healthy 
controls and non-confabulating amnesic patients, confabulating patients tended 
to misrecognize imagined words as heard words (Turner et al., 2010). 
Another different theory suggests that confabulating patients have impairment in 
strategic memory retrieval process (Gilboa, 2006; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; 
Nahum et al., 2010; Turner et al., 2010). According to Moscovitch and Melo 
(Moscovitch, 1992; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997), strategic memory retrieval 
process includes to initiate a search through memory, to constrain searching 
area, and to evaluate and verify the accuracy of retrieved contents, contexts, 
and timestamps. This process proposed by Moscovitch includes multiple 
components and further researches are necessary to clarify whether vmPFC 
confabulating patients have deficits in all or some parts of these components. 
Given the significant overlap in neural basis between autobiographical memory 
recall and episodic future imagining, it may not be so surprising that some 
patients do not only confabulate past events but also confabulate future events 
(Barba et al., 1997; Bertossi, Tesini, et al., 2016). For example, a patient GA 
answered ‘I will go out shopping alone by car’ when examiner asked what she 
planned to do in the next day but what she described in her answer was 
impossible to accomplish. However, this phenomenon could be explained by 
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both the reality monitoring account and the strategic retrieval account. 
Moreover, not every vmPFC amnesic patients suffered from confabulation 
(Bertossi, Aleo, et al., 2016; Ghosh, Moscovitch, Melo Colella, & Gilboa, 2014). 
It is not clear whether lesion within a specific vmPFC sub-region is sufficient to 
cause confabulation or lesion in both vmPFC and some other brain region is 
requisite for confabulation. In short, there are still discrepancies among different 
studies and further evidence is necessary to provide us with a better 
understanding of confabulation. 
A lot of studies focuses on the role of mPFC in decision making and valuation 
(see Chapter 1). Therefore, it would be reasonable to speculate that mPFC 
lesioned patients may have issues on value processing or reward processing. 
Unfortunately, there is only one relevant study. In the study of Bertossi et al. 
(2016), vmPFC patients made choices between small, immediate rewards and 
large, delayed rewards. The results showed that there was a correlation 
between their temporal discounting rates and their ability to imagine future 
events- patients who were unable to imagine future event vividly also tended to 
choose immediate but small reward over delayed, large rewards. 
5.3.5. Application of imagery and autobiographical memory recall 
Both mental imagery and autobiographical memory retrieval contribute to 
potential therapeutic methods for certain mental diseases. 
Experiment 2 revealed that participants changed their preferences and 
motivations after just being immersed in imagination for a few seconds. This is 
in line with a series of studies which improved participants’ motivation to 
135 
 
achieve their goals through imagery training. In a study carried out by Andrade 
and colleagues (Andrade, Khalil, Dickson, May, & Kavanagh, 2016), 
participants who wished to lose body weight and reduce high-calorie snacking 
were introduced to functional imagery training. During the training, participants 
were asked to imagine the positive outcome of reducing snacking for a year and 
how joyful it would feel. They also imagined themselves using techniques and 
methods which they believed were useful in their previous experiences. The 
imagery training lasted for two weeks and, compared to the control group, the 
training group consumed fewer snacks and had motivational thoughts more 
frequently (Andrade et al., 2016). Other studies also demonstrated a similar 
effect of imagery training on reducing food craving (Andrade, May, & Kavanagh, 
2012; Kavanagh, Andrade, May, & Connor, 2014). In another study, the 
intensity of food craving decreased after participants imagining engaging in their 
favourite activities (Knäuper, Pillay, Lacaille, McCollam, & Kelso, 2011). 
Therefore imagery based training could be used for reduction of food craving 
and snacking, which could be used as a strategy to improve healthy eating 
behaviour. Moreover, this may be an alternative or supplemental treatment for 
substance abuse, for instances, tobacco, alcohol, and drugs. However, 
participants in these studies were healthy normal controls. It remains unknown if 
imagery based training could be applied to individuals who have eating 
disorders or substance abuse issues. 
Imagery training could also be applied to individuals who are suffering from 
depression or anxiety disorders. Studies have demonstrated that imagery-
based interpretive bias modification (CBM-I) can improve symptoms of anxiety 
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(e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) and depression (e.g., Holmes, Lang, & 
Shah, 2009; Torkan et al., 2014). CBM-I is a procedure that aims to change 
people’s bias in a positive direction. In this training procedure, a narrator reads 
some virtual scenarios to patients, and patients have to imagine those 
scenarios vividly. All of these scenarios begin with an ambiguous start but end 
with a positive outcome. For example, “You are starting a new job that you very 
much want. You think about what it will be like and feel extremely optimistic” 
(Berna, Lang, Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011; Holmes et al., 2009). After practicing 
imagining lots of ambiguous situations that end with positive outcomes, 
participants showed decreased anxiety levels (e.g., Murphy et al., 2015), 
improvements in depressive symptom (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Lang, 
Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 2012), and increased positive cognitive 
bias or decreased negative bias (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 
2006; Lau, Molyneaux, Telman, & Belli, 2011; Torkan et al., 2014). 
The findings of Experiment 2 could also be applied to develop new interventions 
for memory deficits. Items with higher values became better remembered in 
Experiment 2, a new intervention could involve imagery scenarios which raise 
the values of items to improve their subsequent memory. 
Experiment 3 in the present study demonstrated that the vmPFC was involved 
in subjective value representation during autobiographical memory recall. Speer 
et al (2014) had similar results and they further demonstrated that participants 
were willing to lose monetary reward just for obtaining chances to recall positive 
memories. Speer et al. (2014) suggested that positive memory recall is valuable 
explaining why the reward system was recruited in positive memory recall. In a 
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mouse study, researchers tagged neurones in the dentate gyrus which were 
activated during encoding of a positive experience and reactivated these 
neurones via optogenetic technique later (Ramirez et al., 2015). After 
reactivation of these neurones, depression-related behaviours were significantly 
reduced in the mice. This implies that positive memory retrieval may be able to 
alleviate symptoms of depression. 
Depression does not only influence patients’ emotion, but also impairs their 
ability to retrieve autobiographical memory. People who are suffering from 
depression may tend to collect negative memories, have difficulty accessing a 
specific memory or “overgeneral”, and recall less details of positive memories 
(for a review, see Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014). This is not surprising 
given the involvement of mPFC in both the value/reward system and the 
autobiographical memory system. Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that 
the incorporation of autobiographical memory training could be a potential 
therapeutic method for depression. In fact, interventions adopting 
autobiographical memory-based therapeutics have begun to be developed in 
the past decade and revealed some promising results (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 
2014; Hitchcock et al., 2015, 2016; Neshat-Doost et al., 2013; Raes, Williams, & 
Hermans, 2009). For example, one of the training programme, MEmory 
Specificity Training (MEST), has been found to be able to enhance the 
specificity of autobiographical memory retrieval in depressed individuals (Raes 
et al., 2009) and also reduced the symptoms of depression (Neshat-Doost et 
al., 2013). The MEST consisted of four 1-hour sessions. During each MEST 
session, patients received some cue words and had to recall different life 
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events. The event could be neutral or positive in the first two sessions and then 
negative events were included in the last two sessions. Patients were 
encouraged to recall as many specific details within each event as possible. 
They were also encouraged to focus on the details and elements which made 
those events specific. This practice provided chances for patients to retrieve 
memory-specific details and trained patients to focus attention on aspects other 
than generic components of events. A large number of practices were also 
carried out at home. After the training, the symptom of overgeneral 
autobiographical memory was reduced (Raes et al., 2009) and participants 
became less depressed at a 2-month follow-up (Neshat-Doost et al., 2013). 
5.4. Conclusion 
Since the last decade, cognitive neuroscientists have showed great interest in 
the similarity and dissimilarity between autobiographical memory recall and 
mental imagery. A network, i.e. the core-network, was recognised as the 
common network for both abilities (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). This core-network 
includes mPFC, medial temporal lobe, and posterior parietal cortex. In the 
present thesis, I primarily focused on examining whether the functional role of 
mPFC in autobiographical memory retrieval and mental simulation is subjective 
value representation. 
Experiments from both fMRI studies have shown that (1) mPFC activity was 
parametrically modulated by the subjective value of imagined items during 
imagining those items in certain physiological states, (2) vmPFC activity was 
modulated by value and familiarity of items in autobiographical memory during 
recalling and evaluating those items, (3) vmPFC activity was also modulated by 
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personal significance ratings and emotional intensity evoked by memories 
during recalling memories. Altogether, these findings suggest that the function 
of mPFC in autobiographical memory retrieval and mental imagery might be 
subjective or self-relevant value processing and representation. 
Finally, it is important to note that this thesis does not suggest that subjective or 
self-relevant value processing and representation is the only function of mPFC. 
The mPFC is an extremely large structure in humans, with many anatomical 
subdivisions (see Section 1.2), and might be expected to contribute to a wide 
range of cognitive tasks, see e.g. Figure 5). Accordingly, several studies have 
demonstrated the involvement of mPFC in phenomena that cannot be fully 
explained by this account. For instance, vmPFC patients have impaired 
observational learning but not experiential learning of the association between 
reward size and pictures (Kumaran, Warren, & Tranel, 2015). vmPFC lesion 
induced the change of sleep patterns and depressive-like behaviour in rats 
(Chang, Chen, Qiu, & Lu, 2014). Depressed patients have lower vmPFC 
activation compared to healthy controls during self-inferential processing (for a 
review, see Lemogne et al., 2012). Therefore, it is highly possible that mPFC 
plays other different roles in tasks other than autobiographical memory retrieval 
and episodic imagery. 
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